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Kenneth L. Failor ("Mr. Failor"), Premium Plastics, Inc. fTPI") and Mary Gilmer, 
("Mrs. Gilmer") respectfully submit this Brief of the Appellants. Collectively, they are 
sometimes hereinafter referred to as "Premium Plaintiffs". 
L 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred in granting Defendant's Motion to Strike 
Jury Demand, effectively dismissing all of the Premium Plaintiffs legal claims and denying 
the Premium Plaintiffs' right to a jury trial, all of which is contrary to Rule 53 (e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Art. 1 Section 10 of the Utah Constitution. 
Standard of Review: The district court's denial of the Premium Plaintiffs' right to a 
jury trial on the basis that this is only an equitable accounting case is a legal conclusion which 
is reviewed for correctness. See OLPy LLC v. l&urningham, 2008 UT App 173 U 11. 
Preservation of Issue in District Court: The Premium Plaintiffs preserved this 
issue below in: 
Their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Jury Demand 
and for Judgment on the Special Master's Final Report (R. 2374-76); 
Their Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike 
the Jury Demand and for Judgment on the Master's Report (R. 6324-26; 6330-37); 
and 
393518v.4 
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Oral argument at hearing on March 6, 2008 (R. 6716). 
Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in denying the Premium Plaintiffs' 
Objections to the Master's Ex Parte Process and Final Report? 
Standard of Review: The district court's rejection of the Premium Plaintiffs 
objections to the report of the Special Master under Rule 53 is the interpretation of a jule of 
civil procedure which is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Vlumb v. State, 809 
P.2d 734, 741 (Utah 1990), Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, \ 9,141 P.3d 629. 
Preservation of Issue in District Court: the Premium Plaintiffs preserved this 
issue below in: 
Their Objections to the Final Report of the Special Master (R. 840-1109); 
Their Supplemental Memorandum Re: Objections to the Master's Report (R. 6330-
37); and 
Oral argument at hearing on March 6, 2008 (R. 6716). 
Issue 3: Whether the district court erred in denying the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion 
to File an Amended Complaint? 
Standard of Review: The district court's denial of the Premium Plaintiffs request to 
file an amended complaint is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See Fishbaugh v. Utah 
Voiver<&Ught, 969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1998) (citing Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 
92 (Utah 1992)). 
Preservation of Issue in District Court: The Premium Plaintiffs preserved this 
issue below in: 
Their Motion for Leave to File an Amended Consolidated Complaint (R.6527-6585); 
2 
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Their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File an Amended 
Consobdated Complaint (R 6678-87), and 
Oral argument at hearing on March 6, 2008 (R 6716) 
IL 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative Constitutional provisions, rules and statutes are as follows 
United States Constitution, 7th Amend. 
In [s]uits at common law, where the value m controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved " 
Utah Constitution, Art. I Sec. 10. 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate In court so 
general jurisdiction, except m capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict A jury m a civil case shall be waived unless demanded 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1. Right to jury trial. 
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, 
with or without money damages, or for money claimed as due 
upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for 
injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury is 
waived or a reference is ordered 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it any time within 20 
days after it is served Otherwise a party may his pleading only by leave 
of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be 
freely given where justice so requires 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 38. Jury trial of right. 
393518v 4 
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Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by 
The constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved 
to the parties. 
Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue 
triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory fee and 
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing 
at any time after the commencement of the action and not 
later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed 
upon a pleading of the party. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53(c): 
The order of reference to the may specify or limit his powers and may 
direct him to report only upon particular issues or to do or perform 
particular acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the 
time and place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing 
of the master's report. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (e)(3): 
Injury actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall not be 
directed to report the evidence. His finding upon the issues submitted 
to him are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be 
read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections 
in point of law which may be made to the report. 
Ill 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposit ion Be low 
This is a breach of royalty contract dispute.1 Under the contracts at issue, MegaDyne 
is required to pay plaintiffs Mr. Failor, Mr. Harvey Van Epps Gilmer2 and Premium Plastics, 
1
 This is a consolidated case. The first case asked for damages and royalties earned up until 
July 31 , 1998. The second case was for damages and royalties earned after July 31, 1998. 
The two cases were consolidated on August 19, 2003. (R. 3363-3365, 3367-3371, and 3480-
3482). Only in the first case was a Master appointed and only the first case is the subject of 
the Interlocutory Order, appealed by the Premium Plaintiffs. 
4 
(a) 
(b) 
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Inc. and its owner Harvey Van Epps Gilmer (collectively referred to herein as "the Premium 
Plaintiffs") $0.05 and $0.06 as royalties for surgical tips and balls coated by MegaDyne with a 
Teflon-like substance. In its Complaint and Jury Demand, the Premium Plaintiffs asserted 
five claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
(3) unjust enrichment; (4) accounting; and (5) intentional and negligent misrepresentation 
and non-disclosure. (R. 1-43). 
After the Premium Plaintiffs filed the Complaint, the parties moved and obtained the 
appointment of a Special Master. (R. 72-83). The Order of Reference required the Master 
to prepare a report of his findings regarding the amount of MegaDyne's product coated and 
the amount of MegaDyne's product sold under the agreements between the parties. (R. 86 j^ 
4) Ex parte communications were strictly forbidden (R. 86-87, |^ 5). 
Nevertheless, the Master used an ex parte process to gather and analyze MegaDyne's 
documents. Also, the Master's report exceeded the Order of Reference by calculating what 
the Master believed to be an overpayment of royalties. Objections to the Master ex parte 
process, his failure to abide by the Order of Reference and his internally inconsistent report 
were filed the Premium Plaintiffs. (R. 6330-6337, 2143-2185, and 846-1109) 
Meanwhile, the Premium Plaintiffs successfully subpoenaed documents from third 
party suppliers which showed that the Premium Plaintiffs were underpaid and that 
MegaDyne had been successful in obtaining a patent infringement judgment based on a per 
unit coated basis. 
2
 Mr. Gilmer, the owner of Premium Plastics, Inc., died during the proceedings below. 
Consequently, his wife and trustee of Mr. Gilmer's Trust was substituted as a party plaintiff. 
5 
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Thereafter MegaDyne moved to strike the Premium Plaintiffs' jury demand and the 
Premium Plaintiffs moved to amend the Complaint. (R. 4635-4637, 6527-6585). The trial 
court denied the Premium Plaintiffs' objections to the Master's report, and their motion to 
amend the complaint. The Court granted MegaDyne's motion to strike the jury demand. 
(R. 6702-6705) 
The Premium Plaintiffs subsequendy petitioned for permission to appeal the 
interlocutory order of the trial court. Permission was granted on June 27, 2008. (R. 6712). 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
Background of Parties9 Relationship Giving Rise to Litigation 
1. MegaDyne was initially incorporated April 17, 1985 as American Medical 
Products, Inc.3 
2. In 1987, Dr. Marsden Blanch, a founder of MegaDyne, filed his first 
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") as the 
purported inventor of an electrosurgical knife utilizing a two-step P T F E coating process. Dr. 
Blanch's first application, filed on February 24, 1987, was issued as Patent No. 4,785,807 (the 
" '807" patent) in 1988. On March 19, 1987, Dr. Blanch assigned his rights in the technology 
and products to MegaDyne. O n November 2, 1987, the U S P T O recorded the transfer of 
Mr. Blanch's interests in the '807 patent to MegaDyne. (R. 6531). 
3. In February 1986, Mr. Failor began discussions with Harvey Van Epps Gilmer 
("Mr. Gilmer"), a California chemical engineer and expert in plastic coatings. In June 1986, 
Mr. Gilmer and his company Premium Plastics Inc. ("PPI") began to work on developing, 
3
 American Medical Products, Inc.'s name was changed to MegaDyne Medical Products, Inc. 
on February 22, 1989. The company is hereinafter referred to as "MegaDyne." 
6 
393518v.4 
perfecting and applying the nonstick coating on electrosurgical blades for MegaDyne. (R. 
6531-32). 
4. Subsequently, Mr. Failor developed the prototype two-step coating process 
for applying the PTFE to medical instruments. In 1986, Mr. Failor engaged Mr. Gilmer to 
begin large-scale production of the medical instruments. By January 1987, Mr. Failor had 
developed a protocol for processing MegaDyne's coated units for mass market production. 
(R. 6531-32). 
5. Mr. Gilmer and PPI developed trade secrets consisting of a manufacturing 
process for coating medical instruments with PTFE, including the detailed, sequential steps 
involved, selecting products in connection with the process and improving on the coating 
technology described in and covered by MegaDyne's '807 patent. (R. 6532). 
6. On August 10, 1987, Dr. Blanch filed a division of the original c807 patent. 
That application issued as Patent No . 4,876,110 on October 24, 1989. (R. 6532). 
7. In April of 1988, after Dr. Blanch's second patent filing, Mr. Failor entered 
into a compensation agreement in which Mr. Failor was responsible for providing certain 
services to MegaDyne in exchange for compensation. (R. 6532). The compensation 
agreement provided that Mr. Failor would be paid based upon number of units of specified 
products that were actually sold to and paid for by customers based on the following 
schedule: 
Agreement Year Time Period Compensation Per Unit 
Year 1 -3 April 20,1988- April 19,191 $.08 
Year 4 April 20,1991 - April 19,1992 $.07 
7 
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Year 5 April 20, 1992 - April 19, 1993 $.06 
Year 6 April 20, 1993 - April 19, 1997 $.05 
(R. 6444). A copy of the Agreement is attached in the addendum. 
8. Under a June 1, 1988 Exclusive Product Coating Agreement, PP1 and Mr. 
Gilmer agreed to and did provide MegaDyne with trade secrets developed in connection 
with the coating process and cooperated with MegaDyne in perfecting the application for 
MegaDyne's products. A copy of the Agreement is attached in the addendum. PPI and Mr. 
Gilmer retained as their own proprietary trade secrets, certain refinements and technologies 
developed on MegaDyne's behalf. (R. 6532). 
9. On or about March 26, 1991, PPI and Mr. Gilmer entered into an 
"Agreement" (the "1991 Contract") with MegaDyne whereby PPI agreed to continue to 
provide coating services to MegaDyne upon the terms and conditions of the 1988 Contract. 
(R. 6533). A copy of the 1991 Contract is attached in the addendum. 
10. The parties further agreed under the 1991 Contract that MegaDyne would pay 
Mr. Gilmer six cents ($.06) per product coated by MegaDyne or its designee, that Mr. 
Gilmer would provide to MegaDyne the trade secret knowledge, expertise, formula and 
methods of application and processing "learned by Mr. Gilmer and PPI" , to enable 
MegaDyne to coat certain of MegaDyne's medical products. (R. 6533). 
11. Also under the 1991 Contract, MegaDyne agreed to provide to PPI and Mr. 
Gilmer any and all records necessary to perform an audit to ensure MegaDyne's payment 
compliance. The 1991 Contract further provides that, in the event an audit discloses a 
393518v.4 
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variance of greater than five percent (5%) between what was paid and what was due to Mr. 
Mr. Gilmer, the cost of the audit would be borne by MegaDyne. (R. 6533). 
12. The 1991 Contract was modified by a "Contract Modification" (the "1991 
Modification"), which was signed shordy after execution of the 1991 Contract. Pursuant to 
the 1991 Modification, MegaDyne agreed to require present and future suppliers of metal 
cautery tips and laparoscopic devices to provide copies of all invoices to Mr. Gilmer. (R. 
6533). A copy of the 1991 Modification is attached in the addendum 
13. The 1991 Contract was further modified by a "Contract Modification" dated 
September 15, 1997 (the "1997 Modification") whereby MegaDyne agreed to pay PPI six 
cents ($.06) for each product coated by MegaDyne through September 30, 1997. (R. 6534). 
14. MegaDyne also agreed that beginning October 1, 1997, and continuing until 
December 1, 2005, MegaDyne would pay to PPI six cents ($.06) for each coated Product 
invoiced or shipped to a third party for use or resale, including samples and consignments, 
and agreed that returns and bad debts would not be debited against payments due to PPI. 
MegaDyne further agreed that it would make payments due to PPI on a monthly basis, with 
payments to be made within a month and ten days after the end of each month and that it 
would accompany each monthly payment with a computer printout reporting all coated 
Electrodes invoiced and /o r shipped during the month with consecutive invoice numbers, 
date, total Electrodes on each invoice and applicable lot numbers. (R. 6534). 
15. The cooperative relationship between the parties began to crumble after 
MegaDyne took the coating process in-house and began paying royalties to the Premium 
Plaintiffs. After receiving an average monthly payment of $22,642 in royalties in 1996, PPFs 
9 
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royalties reached a high point of $43,490 in March 1997, followed by an unexplained steep 
decline, as follows. 
Feb-97 $28,687 
Mar-97 $43,490 
Apr-97 $27,820 
May-97 $2,144 
Jun-97 $4,194 
Jul-97 $7,758 
Aug-97 $8,334 
Sep-97 $11,375 
Oct-97 0 
Nov-97 $851 
(R 481, ex. 3 to the Special Master's Report) 
16. The Premium Plaintiffs' efforts to resolve the disparities amicably were 
unsuccessful. The reports that MegaDyne provided with the royalty payments failed to 
support the payment amount made to Premium Plastics, Inc and Mr. Faiior. MegaDyne's 
royalty reports did not include certain safeguards the contracts required to make the 
accounting more transparent, such as lot numbers and consecutive invoices. Also, as the 
years passed, the apparent growth of the company, evident in MegaDyne's expansion of 
facilities and personnel, was not reflected in the royalties that the Premium Plaintiffs 
received, which remained essentially flat over time. (R. 6535). 
17. This case was initiated by the Premium Plaintiffs on or about July 31, 1998, 
after MegaDyne's federal lawsuit was dismissed pursuant to a Stipulation without Prejudice. 
The Premium Plaintiffs' Complaint and Jury Demand asserted legal claims for breach of 
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and misrepresentation/non-
disclosure. The Complaint included alternative equitable claims for unjust enrichment and 
for an accounting. (R. 1-43). 
10 
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Appointment of Special Master and Adoption of Order of Reference 
18. The parties agreed in January 1999 to the appointment of a Special Master 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53 to prepare a report on the amount of products 
coated and sold. (R. 72-79). 
19. The Order of Reference, which specifically sets forth and limits the duties of 
the Special Master, provided that the Special Master act pursuant to the Order of Reference 
in determining the amount of products coated and sold. Specifically, the Order of Reference 
provides: 
The issues relating to the amount of the Defendant's products coated and the 
Defendant's coated products sold under the Agreements are hereby referred 
to the Master. 
(R. 84-90). Order of Reference ("Order") ^j3, a copy is attached hereto in the addendum. 
20. The Order of Reference also provided: 
• That the Master meet with parties to establish a work plan for the 
preparation of the Special Master's report and comply with certain 
deadlines in preparing and submitting his report to the trial court 
(Order at % 6(a); 
• That the Special Master not engage in any improper ex parte 
communications with the parties to the litigation (Order at j^ 5); 
• That the Special Master may conduct discovery and require the 
production of books, papers, documents, vouchers, etc. (Order at j^ 
5); 
• That the Special Master submit his report to the trial court and to the 
parties along with copies of all evidence relied upon by the Master to 
support the findings in the report (Order at ^ 6(d)). 
Work Plan/ Deadlines 
393518v.4 
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21. The Premium Plaintiffs submitted a proposed work plan to the Special Master 
but he neither accepted nor rejected the Premium Plaintiffs' proposed work plan. In fact, 
the Master refused to establish a work place of the preparation of his report. When the 
Premium Plaintiffs inquired about creating a work plan, the Master said that he would do 
those tasks as he "deemed necessary." (R. 1235). 
22. The Master never did establish a plan with counsel for both parties before 
March 2, 1999 as required by the Order of Reference. Instead, as stated by the Master 
before Judge Thorne, "w7e did not want to disclose [a] work plan to the parties because that 
would be basically tipping our hand as to what areas we were going to examine." (R. 1235-
36). 
23. The Master failed to provide the court with a status report by the deadline in 
the Order of Reference and instead filed it 400 days later. (R. 1239). 
24. The Master failed to complete his work by April 23, 2000, as ordered by the 
trial court, or submit a letter to the court indicating anything additional that needed to be 
done. Rather the Special Master never submitted a letter to the court, did not request an 
extension and did not file his draft report until June 16, 2000. (R. 430-645). His final report 
was later filed on August 2, 2000 (R. 803-833). 
Improper Ex Parte Process 
25. From the beginning of his work until the Master submitted his final report, 
the Master used an unfair ex parte process. MegaDyne's former accountant testified: 
A: They came out early May, two people, I believe 
* * * 
A: They were there for weeks. 
Q: Did you give them a room to work out of? 
12 
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A: The conference room. 
Q: Out at MegaDyne? 
A: Yes 
* * * 
Q: About how often would you meet with the 
folks from Ernst and Young? 
A: Well, I would only come to the office on 
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. 
* * * 
Q: So you would go out there three times a 
week? 
A: Most of the time, they would be there, 
there may be a day or two when they were not. 
Q: Is that it? 
A: Right 
* * * 
Q: Who else from MegaDyne, if you know, 
met with the folks at Ernst and Young besides you? 
A: 1 know Brian did. 
Q: Anybody else? 
A: They asked Jeff Roberts to give them 
electronic information from time to time . . . . I know 
that he had conversations with them about exactly what 
they needed and he gave them disks. 
(R. 1237-38). 
26. The Master admitted that he conducted his document investigation at 
MegaDyne, with MegaDyne, and on an ex parte basis: 
Upon our arrival at MegaDyne, we were introduced to key 
accounting and manufacturing personnel, given a tour of the 
facilities, and shown to the conference room. The conference 
room contained approximately 10 to 15 boxes of sales invoices, 
general ledger detail for the period under inspection, receipts 
and invoices and other financial records. . . . We reviewed, 
inspected, analyzed and obtained support for and brief 
explanations of electronic and paper forms of documents that 
we deemed necessary to determine the number of products 
coated and sold under the invoices. 
(R. 1238). 
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27. The Master also engaged in improper ex parte communications by asking that 
"MegaDyne prepare[| a schedule . . . that indicated the quantity recejved and the quantity 
coated" to determine the amount of products coated. The Master then spot checked with 
copies of invoices. (R. 1239). 
Failure to Conduct Discovery 
28. Throughout the proceedings, the Master never issued one subpoena and never 
served any Rule 34 Request for Production of Documents. Consequently, it was impossible 
for the parties to know what documents had been made available to the Master or the 
documents on which the Master relied in reaching his decision. (R. 1236). 
29. MegaDyne has in its possession the following documents that would have 
enabled the Master to determine the amount of products coated and products sold: 
purchase orders to suppliers, receiving logs, shipping receipts, production schedules, 
inspection documents, coating reports, coating process traveler reports, manufacturing 
department inspection reports, quality control inspection reports, packaging documents, 
sterilization certificates, balance sheets, income statements, cash flow documents, sales 
journals, sales reports, unit activity reports, unit inventory reports, and packaging lists. The 
Master, however, never obtained or relied upon those documents in preparing his r epor t (R. 
1242). 
30. MegaDyne's former accountant testified that the Master was only given "a 
small port ion" of the financial statements, that no sales reports were provided for the time 
prior to October 1, 1997, and that the unit activity reports and inventory reports, as well as 
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the sales orders and packaging lists, were not asked for by or were not provided to the 
Master. (R. 1243). 
31. The Master did state that he had access to original invoices. But he only 
tested 61 out of 28,000 transactions. (R. 2129) 
Unreliability of Final Report 
37. The Master failed to include with his report any documents, evidence or 
testimony relied upon in preparing the report. Instead of attaching relevant documents and 
evidence to his final report as required by the Order of Reference, the Master attached to his 
preliminary report schedules of payments, purchase, and units coated, all created by the 
Master. The evidence and underlying and supporting documents used by the Master to 
create his schedules to create his final report were not provided. (R. 1240-1241, 2125-2133). 
36. The basic documents relied upon by the Master do not support his findings in 
the report. The following errors/inconsistencies reviewed by the Master were found by the 
Premium Plaintiffs' expert: 
• Documents produced by the Master show that the amount of products 
coated, at a minimum, is 397,306 pieces more than the number determined by 
the Master; (R. 852). 
• The schedule of invoices provided by the Master show that a minimum of 
$62,227.14 is due to Mr. Gilmer; (R.852) 
• The Master failed to explain why Mr. Failor purchases declines from an 
average of at least 375,000 per month to 18,000 in November 1996; (R. 856) 
• The Master failed to explain why there are wide variations in the products 
coasted between the Mr. Failor and the Mr. Gilmer/Premium Plastics' 
schedules; (R. 857) 
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• The Master does not explain why the Mr. Failor and Mr. Gilmer schedules 
were constructed differently, i.e. why they are not in the same format so that 
numbers could be easily compared to check for accuracy; (R. 856-57) 
• The Master failed to explained how units coated could decline from 511,550 
in April 1997 to 50,613 in May of 1997 and 44,505 in August 1997; (R. 857) 
• The Master failed to address, for example, inconsistencies in the report that 
show that more products was coated than was sold (it is impossible to sell 
units that don't exists). (R.857) 
37. On or about August 18, 2000, the Premium Plaintiffs filed its Objection to the 
Final Report of the Special Master based on the master's failure to abide by the procedures 
in the Order of Reference and the errors and inconsistencies in the Master's report as set 
forth above. (R. 840-1109). 
38. On or about October 31, 2007, based on the report of the Premium Plaintiffs' 
forensic accountant, the Premium Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Re: 
Plaintiffs' Objections to the Master's Report setting forth the following additional objections 
to the Master's Report: 
• The Master did not compute the number of coated units by extrapolating 
information from MegaDyne's coating reports. Rather, he relied upon a 
schedule prepared for him by MegaDyne; (R. 6332) {see Affidavit and 
Report of Derk Rasmussen, R. 2102) 
• The MegaDyne schedule relied upon by the Master was incomplete in that 
it omitted 25 products; (R. 6332, 2102, 2114, 2115) 
• The Master only tested five lot numbers with records of coating processing 
condition reports, all within the months of May and June 1996; (R. 6332, 
2103) 
• The schedules relied upon by the Master did not include all the batches 
coated; (R. 6332, 2103) 
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• N o all lots were included during the months of March through June of 
1997 and there were at least three lots totaling over 800,000 unaccounted 
for by the Master; (R. 6332, 2103) 
• Since not all of the coated products were included in MegaDyne's 
schedule, none of the ROCPC reports were reviewed and not all lot 
numbers were accounting meaning that Special Master could not have 
calculated all of the products coated; (R. 6332-6333, 2103) 
• For the period of January 1997 through September 1997, the Master did 
not independendy calculate the number of units coated, but simply 
deferred to the quantities provided on the schedule prepared by 
MegaDyne for the Master; (R. 6333, 2104) 
• For the coated products sold, the Master tested only 61 transactions out of 
28,000 invoices; (R. 6333, 2105) 
• The Master did not perform any tests verifying that the information 
contained in the invoices was complete; (R. 6333, 2105) 
• The Master failed to sufficiently document how he reached his 
conclusions; (R. 6333, 2105) 
• The Master calculated a beginning inventory of 1,219,167 units as of 
March 1, 1996 without any documented evidence supporting that figure. 
Rather the Master simply backed into the number by starting with the 
September 30, 1197 inventory, added his calculation of sold units and 
subtracted his calculations of units purchased. For the Master to be 
correct, MegaDyne would have had to sell 1,072,782 units during January 
to February 1996, something MegaDyne had never done; (R. 6333, 2106) 
• The Master did not reconcile the beginning inventory with the closest 
known physical inventory of December 31, 1995; (R. 6333, 2106) 
• The Master did not have all of the production reports and sales sub ledgers 
did not match the production totals; (R. 6333, 2107) 
• In calculating the beginning inventory of 1,219,167, the Master overlooked 
MegaDyne's documents showing a beginning inventory of only 60,000 
units; (R. 6333) 
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• The errors in the Master's calculations results in underpayments to PPI 
and Mr Gilmer of at least $69,550 00 and underpayment to Mr Failor of 
$57,958 00, (R 6334) 
• Invoices from MegaDyne's ups and balls supplier, National Wire Services 
show that PPI and Mr Gilmer were underpaid royalties of at least 
$132,384 00, (R 6334) 
• Royalties calculated from the purchase of coating material demonstrate 
that PPI and Mr Gilmer were underpaid by at least 1,400,797 00, (R 
6334) 
• By analyzing business trends created by third party documents, PPFs 
expert calculated that PPI and Mr Gilmer were underpaid at least 
$877,067 00, (R 6334) 
• PPFs expert accountant examined documents from third parties and from 
MegaDyne and concluded that based on vendor unit purchases only, PPI 
and Mr Gilmer were underpaid at least $2,831,075 and by applying the 
royalty trend analysis to the documents reviewed, P P I / M r Gilmer were 
underpaid royalties b^ $2,411
 ?284, (R 6334) 
• Royalties calculated from vendor invoices show that Mr Failor was 
underpaid at least $7,255 m 1997, (R 6335) 
• The Master did not examine the documents from coating material 
suppbers If he had, he would have learned that from March 1996 through 
April 1997, Mr Failor was underpaid by at least $440,000 00, (R 6335) 
• For the period from March 1996 through April 1997, the checks, coating 
reports and matenal certifications show that the Master reached erroneous 
conclusions regarding the number of units coated, l e , the Master found 
that 4,747,425 units were coated when the documents show that between 
4,854,984 and 4,912,864 were coated, (R 6335) 
• The Master incorrectly determined that Mr Failor earned royalties from 
March 1996 through April 1997 of $237,371 25 when the documents show 
that Mi Fallot actually earned royalties during that period from between 
$262,422 25 to 264,432 35, (R 6336) 
• The Master never reconciled the difference between the electronic 
download provided by MegaDyne reflecting spatula coating with 
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MegaDyne's spatula coating reports which resulted in an additional 
$8,323.44 owed to PPI and Mr. Gilmer. (R. 6336) 
Denial of Jury Trial 
39. On or about August 30, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Jury 
Demand and for Judgment on the Special Master's Final Report asserting that the Premium 
Plaintiffs were not entided to a jury trial on the equitable accounting claim, that the case was 
too complicated to be submitted to a jury, and requesting that the Court enter judgment 
based solely on the Special Master's Report under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53. (R. 
1135-37). 
40. In the Premium Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Jury Demand and for Judgment on the Special Master's Report, the 
Premium Plaintiffs asserted that they have never received an accurate accounting from 
defendants or the Special Master in more than nine (9) years of litigation and that they did 
not waive and are not precluded from having a jury trial on their legal claims. They also 
asserted that under Rule 53, the Special Master's report may, at most, be submitted as 
evidence by a jury. (R. 2374-76). 
41. Throughout the proceeding, MegaDyne persistently refused to produce 
relevant documents as shown by the following: 
• October 1999: Order to Compel Production of Discovery; (R. 163-
34) 
• August 2000: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order; (R. 1148-
52) 
• December 2000: PPI's Motions for Sanctions for Noncompliance 
with Discovery; (R. 1364-98) 
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• December 2000: MegaDyne's Motion to Quash PPI's Subpoenas 
Duces Tecum; (R. 1440-42) 
• June 2001: Order Requiring MegaDyne's to Allow PPI to Review 
all Documentation Made Available to Special Master and Other 
Discovery Requests; (R. 1949) 
• July 2001- Protective Order issued; (R. 1973-78) 
• August 2001: Stipulation and Order re: PPI's Access to Master's 
Documents; (R. 1979-81) 
• October 2001: PPI's Motion to Compel Document Production and 
Third Document Production Request; (R. 1996-98) 
• November 2001: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order; (R. 
2266-71). 
• February 2002: Order Granting PPI's Access to Some Requested 
Documents and Granting MegaDyne's Motion for Protective 
Order on Others. Deferred evidentiary hearing on whether special 
master exceeded the order of reference; (R. 2410-11) 
• August 2002: PPI's Motion for Sanctions for Discovery 
Noncompliance; (R. 2606-2959) 
• September 2002: Order Deferring Sanctions and Granting PPI's 
Discovery; (R. 3001-05) 
• April 2003: PPI 's Motion to Compel Discovery or Rule 37 
sanctions; (R. 3110-3188) 
• July 2003: Order Compelling Discovery; (R. 3466-68) 
• May 2004: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order Denying 
Discovery; (R. 4400-07) 
• September 2004: Bench Ruling ordering MegaDyne's to produce 
400 sample invoices; (R. 4656) 
• September 2005: Order compelling production of 400 sample 
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invoices; (R. 4724-27) 
• August 2007: Parties reached stipulation to access certain sealed 
documents from MegaDyne's Aspen Labs litigation in federal court. 
(R. 6304) 
42. After MegaDyne repeatedly stonewalled discovery, as set forth above, the 
Premium Plaintiffs succeeded in subpoenaing documents from out-of-state third party 
suppliers and sources.4 The Premium Plaintiffs also obtained patent litigation information in 
a hearing in federal court on August 10, 2007, after MegaDyne refused to supply the 
information. (R. 6535). 
Denial of Motion to Amend 
43. In the documents obtained by the Premium Plaintiffs in the federal court, the 
Premium Plaintiffs discovered that MegaDyne licensed the coating of medical products and 
provided PPPs trade secrets to third parties. (R. 6534). 
44. MegaDyne has successfully prosecuted patent litigation, including but not 
limited to the following: MegaDyne v. Aaron Med. Industries, case no: 2:96CV0233 UC (1998); 
MegaDyne v. American Catheter, case no: 2:97XC0166 D A K (1998); MegaDyne v. DeRoyal 
Industries et al, case no: 2:00CV00267 TC (1999); MegaDyne v. Olsen Electrical Medical, case no: 
2:91CV00019 BST (1993); MegaDyne v. Saron, case no: 2:97CV00228 TC (1997); MegaDyne v. 
Triad MedicalTech et al, case no: 2:00CV00548-18 (2003); MegaDyne v. UniMed Medical Products, 
case no: 2:01CV0021 D A K (2001); and MegaDyne Medical Products Inc. v. Aspen Labs Jncy case 
no: 2 : 9 1 C V 0 0 8 5 2 V S J ( 1 9 9 1 ) ^ (R. 6534-35). 
4
 The Premium Plaintiffs requested this information from defendants on several occasions 
during the litigation, including in Plaintiffs Second Request for Production of Documents 
filed on June 28, 2000, and in a Motion to Compel filed October 17, 2001. (R. 2217-2256). 
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45. Mr. Failor and Mr. Gilmer provided supporting testimony and disclosed their 
trade secrets in the Aspen Labs litigation to enable MegaDyne to prevail. The documents 
obtained from third parties and the information provided by Mr. Gilmer and Mr. Failor in 
the Aspen Labs litigation was subsequently used by MegaDyne to prevail in the other cases 
specified above. (R. 6535). 
46. As a result, MegaDyne received compensation from some or all the 
defendants named above based on a formula of a fixed amount per coated unit 
manufactured or sold by the foregoing defendants and /or gross sales, or other as yet 
undisclosed formulas. (R. 6535). 
47. Throughout the parties' relationship, the Premium Plaintiffs and MegaDyne 
were bound by confidentiality agreements and duties of good faith and fair dealing. 
However, as a result of the Aspen Labs litigation, PPI, Mr. Gilmer and Mr. Failor was 
induced to disclose trade secrets that were not obligated under contract, but which were 
used to the monetary benefit of MegaDyne's and for which the Premium Plaintiffs received 
no compensation. (R. 6535). 
48. MegaDyne did not pay any of the proceeds received from the patent litigation 
to the Premium Plaintiffs or compensate the Premium Plaintiffs for units unlawfully coated 
by the third party defendants or for units designated by MegaDyne with the foregoing 
defendants. (R. 6535). 
49. On or about Decemb.er 5, 2007, the Premium Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Leave to File an Amended Consolidated Complaint requesting that it be permitted to file an 
amended complaint to assure that all issues were fully and properly litigated in one forum 
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and to include claims based on the information and documents that had been received by 
the Premium Plaintiffs regarding the patent litigation in which defendants were involved. 
(R.6586-89). 
50. The Premium Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint was 
filed prior to the deadline for the amendment of pleadings. (R. 6318-23; 6586-89). 
51. On March 6, 2008, the district court held a hearing on each of the above-
referenced motions. The Order from the hearing provides: 
1. This case involves an accounting issue. The parties 
previously agreed that a special master was to be appointed and 
present his report to the Court. Accounting is an equitable 
remedy and the Plaintiffs are not entided to a jury on the issue. 
Defendant's motion to strike the jury demand is granted. 
2. Plaintiffs [sic] objections to the method of assembling 
the report of the Special Master are noted. The Court has 
previously rejected the Plaintiffs [sic] objections as they relate 
to the Special Master's exceeding the scope of the Order of 
Reference, contact with the parties, the filing of a work plan and 
the method of obtaining documents from the Defendants. The 
Court, once again, denies these objections. 
3. Plaintiffs [sic] request to depose the Special Master has 
previously been denied. The Plaintiff has presented no new 
grounds for the Court to revisit this denial. Plaintiffs Motion 
to Depose the Special Master is denied. 
4. Plaintiffs [sic] Motion for a Hearing on the Report of 
the Special Master. The Utah R. Civ. P. 53 provides that the 
Court is to accept the Report of the Special Master's finding of 
fact unless clearly erroneous. An objection to the report has 
been made accompanied by a request for a hearing. Based upon 
the allegations of error coupled with a report from the 
Plaintiffs [sic] expert, the Court determines that it is proper to 
grant the Plaintiffs [sic] request for a hearing on the Report of 
the Special Master. The Court has some concerns about the 
scope of such a hearing. Therefore, it directs that the parties 
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meet, agree to a proposed format and consult with the Court to 
finalize the procedures to be followed. 
5. Plaintiffs [sic] Motion to file an Amended Complaint is 
denied. This case is ten years old. The new issues raised by the 
Amended Complaint cannot be addressed in an accounting 
issue case. If the Plaintiffs [sic] desire to raise these new issues, 
they will have to do it in a separate action. 
(R. 6703-04). 
IV 
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T S 
Unquestionably, the lower court committed reversible error in striking the Premium 
Plaintiffs demand for a jury trial. Their right to a jury trial is protected by Article I, Section 
10 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 and Rules 38 and 53 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, simply because a party pleads both legal and equitable 
claims, is no justification for denying a jury trial. Instead, the jury decides the facts on the 
legal claims first. 
Finally the appointment of a Special Master, does not deprive a litigant of a jury trial. 
The Master's report is simply given to the jury as evidence. Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The lower court also clearly erred in not rejecting the Master's report. There is no 
question the Master repeatedly violated the Order of Reference, engaged in unfair ex parte 
process, and came up with an internally, inconsistent and impossible report. Both the 
process used by the Master and the substance of the report itself dictates a rejection of the 
Master's report. 
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Lastly, the Premium Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their Complaint. The 
Complaint is based on facts recendy discovered after MegaDyne stonewalled discovery. 
Also, judicial economy and the lack of procedure to MegaDyne suggests a reversal of the 
lower court on this issue. 
V, 
ARGUMENT 
I. T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING T H E PREMIUM 
PLAINTIFFS' DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL A N D REJECTING 
T H E PREMIUM PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO T H E MASTER'S 
REPORT 
The district court erred in granting MegaDyne's request to strike the Premium 
Plaintiffs' jury demand and in rejecting their objections to the report of the special master. 
The court should have allowed the Premium Plaintiffs to proceed to trial to present all 
evidence regarding their objections to the special master's report and allowing the jury to be 
the final arbiter of the case. The trial court's ruling should accordingly be reversed and the 
case remanded with an instruction that the Premium Plaintiffs are entided to proceed to trial. 
Along with their equitable claim for an accounting, the Premium Plaintiffs initiated 
this action by asserting contract and tort claims in the Complaint and properly demanded a 
jury trial. Constitutional, statutory and common law entides the Premium Plaintiffs to a jury 
trial of its contract and tort claims in this case. 
The United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n [s]uits at common law, where the 
value in controversy shaD exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." 
United States Constitution, 7th Amend. The Utah Constitution similarly guarantees the right 
to a jury trial in civil cases. Utah Const. Art. I Sec. 10. So do Utah Statutes and Rule. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 provides: 
Right to jury trial. 
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, 
with or without money damages, or for money claimed as due 
upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for 
injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury is 
waived or a reference is ordered. 
Id. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 38 provides: 
Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
(c) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by 
The constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved 
to the parties. 
(d) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue 
triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory fee and 
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing 
at any time after the commencement of the action and not 
later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed 
upon a pleading of the party. 
Id. 
A. The Premium Plaintiffs Assertion in the Complaint of Both Legal 
and Equitable Claims D o e s N o t Deprive T h e m of a Jury Trial 
Historically, a distinction was made between cases involving equitable claims in which 
a party is not entided to a jury trial and cases involving legal claims where a party is entided 
to a jury trial: 
In an action where a single claim is presented and a single remedy 
demanded, the action can rationally be classified as one which 
historically would have been either legal or equitable. In such a case, 
the proper approach to deciding whether a claiming has a right to a 
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jury trial is whether the action is legal' or 'equitable5. Similarly, where 
the case presents several claims or demands more than one remedy . . . 
the matter is not more difficult than simply suit if the claims, or the 
remedies, are either all legal or all equitable. Thus, where the case 
presents several claims or demands more than one remedy, the most 
direct test is whether the action now pending before the District Court 
contains legal issues. 
Swoffordv. B<&W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff entitled to jury trial where 
equitable claim for accounting and legal claim for damages asserted). However, 
in a series of cases starting about 40 years ago, the Supreme Court 
changed the focus to some extent. When a proceeding involves a 
mixture of legal and equitable claims, the question is not the character 
of the entire proceeding as legal or equitable, but the character of 
particular issues as legal or equitable. 
Bandy v. Bandy, 237 B.R. 661, 664 (U.S. Bk. E.D. Tenn. 1999). As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court: 
It has long since been held that under our system a legal and 
equitable remedy may be sought in the same action; but each 
remedy must be governed by the same law that would apply to 
it if the other remedy had not also been asked for. An action to 
recover damages . . . is as clearly a legal remedy as any that could 
be named, and it is an action in which a party cannot be 
deprived of a jury trial. 
Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 739, 744 (Utah 1950); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 
531, 537-38 (1970) ("where equitable and legal claims are joined in the same action, there is a 
right to a jury trial on the legal claims which must not be infringed either by trying the legal 
issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a court trial of a common issue existing 
between the claims Jurisdictions throughout the United States agree/'). Jurisdictions 
throughout the United States have followed this doctrine. See Walker v. Jones, 693 F. Supp. 
1202,1203 (Dist. D.C. (1988); University of the Virgin Islands v. Springer, 232 F.Supp.2d 462, 471 
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(D. Virgin Islands 2002); EEOC v. Cony)amestown Corp., 719 F.2d 1219, 1224 (3'd Cir. 1983) 
("It is well established that joint of legal and equitable claims does not result in the waiver of 
a right to a jury trial on the legal claims.7'); Bandy, 237 B.R. 661 at 664 ("court cannot deny a 
jury trial of the legal issues on the ground that they are incidental to the equitable issues"). 
Utah courts have also long adhered to the well-established rule that a party does not 
waive its right to a jury trial by asserting both legal and equitable claims. "Where the issues 
are legal issues, the fact that equitable relief may be prayed for, to carry into effect the 
judgments based upon the legal issues, is not sufficient to deprive either party of his rights to 
have the legal issues submitted to a jury." Petty v. Clark, 129 P.2d 568, 590 (Utah 1942). As 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
The right of trial by jury is a constitutional right, and every 
litigant, in an action of legal cognizance, has an absolute right to 
that method of trial, a right which the court may not disregard. . 
. . The question therefore is: Are legal or equitable principles to 
be applied? If the principles to which appeal must be had are 
principles of law in the main or primary action, either party 
thereto upon demand is entitled to a trial by jury. This is true, 
although in the action application is made to the court to 
exercise its equity powers in granting injunctive relief. Where 
the issues are legal issues, the fact that equitable relief may be 
prayed for, to carry into effect the judgments based upon the 
legal issues, is not sufficient to deprive either party of his rights 
to have the legal issues submitted to a jury. 
Norback v. Bd. of Directors, 37 P.2d 339, 341-43 (Utah 1934) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
According to the allegations of his complaint, plaintiff had two 
rights of action and was entitled to two remedies, of which he 
might pursue either or both at his election, the legal remedy of 
damages . . . and [an] equitable remedy. . . . Under those 
circumstances it will be conceded that the plaintiff would have 
been entitled as of right to a trial by jury of the legal issues as to 
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damages. Instead of doing this, he accepted the invitation held 
out to him by our laws and joined his two actions in one. He 
should not be held to have thereby forfeited his right to a jury 
trial of the legal issues . . . . 
Valley Mortuary, 225 P.2d at 744; Zions First NafI Bank v. Rocky Mtn. Irrigation, 795 P.2d 658, 
662 (Utah 1990) ("when legal and equitable issues turn on the same operative facts, a jury 
must decide the legal issue first; the jury's factual determination binds the trial court in its 
determination of the parallel equitable issue"). 
The fact that the Premium Plaintiffs asserted both legal and equitable claims in this 
case does not preclude a jury trial. Utah law is clear that a party may plead alternative claims 
in a complaint without waiving their right to a jury trial. 
Where a party seeks an accounting, "[t]he fact tha t . . . equitable relief in the form of 
an accounting is [also] sought does not in and of itself preclude a right to a jury trial, as it has 
been declared that the right to a trial by jury does not depend upon the choice of words used 
in pleadings." Bruce v. Bohanony 436 F.2d 733, 736 (10th Or . 1970); see also, Koch v. Koch, 203 
F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2002) (trial on accounting claim); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 
479 (1962) (where both legal and equitable claims exist, a jury may, with proper legal 
instructions, "readily determine the recovery, if any, to be had . . . whether the theory finally 
settled upon is that of breach of contract," an equitable claim or any combination thereof.). 
The trial court's denial of the Premium Plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial on the basis 
that this case involves an accounting was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
B. T h e Appointment of a Special Master Cannot Deprive the 
Premium Plaintiffs of their Right to a Jury Trial 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (e)(3), which governs the appointment of a special 
master in jury trials provides: 
Injury actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall 
not be directed to report the evidence. His finding upon the 
issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the 
matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling 
of the court upon any objections in point of law which may be 
made to the report. 
Id. 
The purpose of the appointment of a special master: 
primarily ought to include findings of fact going to the ultimate issues 
of the case rather than analysis of the evidence yielding the special 
master's conclusions. Legal analysis in a case where there is a jury 
demand is appropriate only to the extent that they provide a proper 
context for the special master's findings of fact. 
Miller v. Bank South Corp., 173 F.R.D. 543, 545 (N.D. Ga. 1997). In complicated cases 
involving an accounting, a special master's report "can help jurors organize and assess 
complicated issues [and a] master's findings [may] reduce the complexity of [an] accounting 
to a manageable level" but cannot remove the case from the jury. Music Suppliers, Inc. v. 
London Records, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3475, 6-7 (D. Mass 1988). "In a jury action, a 
master's finding is not a final determination." Id. at 9. Issues presented to a special master 
are: 
referred merely for purposes of clarification before presentation to the 
jury which remains the ultimate arbiter of the facts. The admission of 
the master's report does not prevent the parties from introducing 
evidence that conflicts with the master's findings, or calling witnesses 
who have testified before the master; the report of the master is merely 
prima facie evidence which the parties may attack at the trial with any 
competent evidence and which the jury is free to disregard. 
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Id. at 9-10. see also Jackson v. Local Union 542, 155 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (E.D. Penn. 2001); 
Eastern Fireproofing Co., Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 50 F.R.D. 140, 142 (D. Mass 1970). 
Although the appointment of a special master is meant to simplify complex issues, 
the parties and the court are not bound by a special master's conclusions. Once a special 
master has prepared a report under Rule 53, any "party who so desires is doubtless free to 
put before the jury any competent evidence are variance with the Master's conclusions." 
Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Conn. 1940); L.K. 
Comstock & Co., Inc. v. Becon Const. Co., Inc. 932 F. Supp. 906, 909-10 (either party may present 
evidence contradicting special master's report and jury need not accept special master's 
findings). Even where parties have agreed to and tried an entire case before a special master, 
the right to a jury trial is nonetheless preserved. Music Suppliers, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3475 at 3-7. As explained by one court: 
The reference to a special master in no way infringes [a party's] 
constitutional rights to a trial by jury. This reference is preliminarily to 
a jury trial and is designed and calculated to simplify, shorten and 
facilitate that trial. . . . [A] report by a special master, distilling the mass 
of facts involved, will certainly aid a correct disposition of the case. It 
is not necessary that the order of reference reserve the parties' right to 
a jury trial because rule 53 (e)(3) itself makes that reservation. . . . 
Instead of denying or impinging upon a trial by jury this reference to a 
master should provide a more scientific and better jury trial. 
Wirt^v. Bunch, 1841 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7210, 4 (M.D. Ga.,1963). 
A party that voluntarily agrees to the appointment of a special master and participates 
in the special master proceedings does not waive a jury demand. Evans v. Boyd Restaurant 
Group, 240 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (11 th Or . 2007). A court commits reversible error by 
adopting a recommendation and report of a special master and denying a jury trial where one 
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has been properly requested by the plaintiff. Id. at 397. As explained by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals: 
Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court, in every suit, save 
where exceptional circumstances are shown. That the case 
involves complex issues of fact and law is no justification for 
reference to a Master, but rather is an impelling reason for a 
trial before an experienced judge. . . . [T]he Master's report in a 
jury case is merely evidence which a jury may disregard. 
Polin v. Dun <&Bradstreet, Inc., 634 F.2d 1319 (10th Or . 1980)(emphasis added). In Henry A. 
Knott Co. v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of West Va., 772 F.2d 78, (4th Cir. 1985), the 
court noted: 
The use of a master does n o t ^ r ^ violate the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial; but, if the master makes 
no factual findings or his findings are unclear, the parties 
must be able to present their case to the jury. 
Id at n.5; see also DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1364 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added) 
(jury trial held where parties stipulated to appointment of special master); Sutton v. Johnson 
Cotton Co., 114 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1940) (master's report may be submitted to jury, but jury 
makes final determinations on issues of fact); Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 
Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Conn. 1940) ("Any party who so desires is doubtless free to 
put before the jury any competent evidence at variance with the Master's conclusions and to 
submit any resulting conflict to the jury."). 
In this case, the Premium Plaintiffs properly requested and is entitled to a jury trial on 
the legal claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and misrepresentation/non-disclosure. In addition, the Premium Plaintiffs are entitled to a 
jury trial on the unjust enrichment claim. See e.g., Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 U T 335 \ 4, 991 P.2d 
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1113; Pacific Chromalox Division v. Irey, 787 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Utah App. 1990). Only the claim 
for an accounting is not subject to the right of a trial by jury. 
The district court failed to even acknowledge the Premium Plaintiffs' legal and 
equitable claims and appears to have simply ignored all claims except the accounting claim in 
ruling that they had no right to a jury trial. Moreover, although the court granted the 
Premium Plaintiffs' request for a hearing on the report of the Special Master, the court 
erroneously applied the standard in Rule 53 applicable to non-jury actions which provides that 
a court may adopt, modify or reject the report of a special master after receiving objections 
to the report from the parties. See Utah R. Civ. P. 53 (e)(2). 
II. T H E TRIAL C O U R T E R R E D I N R E J E C T I N G T H E P R E M I U M 
PLAINTIFFS 5 OBJECTIONS T O T H E R E P O R T O F T H E SPECIAL 
MASTER 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 53 (c) provides: 
The order of reference to the may specify or limit his powers 
and may direct him to report only upon particular issues or to 
do or perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence 
only and may fix the time and place for beginning and closing 
the hearings and for the filing of the master's report. 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 742 (Utah 1990); Ferguson Contracting Co. v. Manhattan Trust Co., 
118 F. 791, 794 (6th Cir 1902) (order of reference is both "the chart and limitation of the 
Master's authority"); U.S. v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N. Y. 1974) (|T]he power of a 
special master is completely dependent upon the Order of Reference"). 
In this case, the Order of Reference included specific procedural requirements, 
including the establishment and compliance with a work plan, the compliance with certain 
deadlines, a prohibition against improper ex parte communications and the submission of a 
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report with all evidence supporting the master's findings in the report. The Master failed to 
comply with any of these mandates in the Order of Reference. The master instead refused 
to establish a work plan and in essence, determined that he had the discretion to carry out 
certain tasks or not at he saw fit. The Master failed to comply with deadlines in the Order of 
Reference, failed to conduct discovery, including serving requests for production of 
documents to the parties or issuing any document subpoenas and failed to submit any 
documents, evidence or testimony supporting his report as required by the Order of 
Reference. The master also engaged in improper ex parte communications with MegaDyne 
in reviewing and discussing MegaDyne's documents at MegaDyne's facility and requesting 
that MegaDyne prepare a schedule regarding the products coated and sold. Rather than 
conducting a thorough examination of the voluminous documents relevant to the issue of 
the amount of products coated and sold, the master instead simply asked MegaDyne for its 
calculations and then simply minimally sampled those figures against invoices provided by 
MegaDyne. The Master also failed to comply with the Order of Reference by failing to 
submit with his report any evidence, testimony of documents relied upon in reaching the 
findings in his report. 
The substantive purpose of the order of Reference was limited to the determination 
of the amount of product coated and sold. The order did not authorize the master to 
conduct an accounting or to calculate any damages or amounts owed to either party. The 
master nonetheless exceeded his authority in the Order of Reference by calculating amounts 
owed to the parties and conducting his version of an inaccurate and incomplete accounting 
of amounts owed based on products sold and coated. The conclusions reached by the 
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Master, in any event, were inaccurate and inconsistent as the Master failed to consider all 
relevant documentation and failed to properly calculate products coated, products sold and 
amounts owed based on those figures. 
Despite the master's utter failure to comply with any of the procedural requirements 
of the Order of Reference and his failure to accomplish the only objective of his 
appointment—calculating the number of products coated and sold—the trial court 
nonetheless rejected the Premium Plaintiffs' objections to the Master's report. 
In the Order denying the Premium Plaintiffs' objections to the report of the special 
master, the trial court improperly references the clearly erroneous standard found in Rule 53 
(e) (2) which is applicable only to special master's findings in non-jury actions. In jury, 
actions, a court is not bound to accept the report of the special master unless clearly 
erroneous. Rather, as explained above, the special master's findings are merely evidence to 
be submitted to the jury at trial Thus, instead of rejecting the Premium Plaintiffs' objections 
to the special master's report, the court should have ordered the special master to comply 
with the requirements of the Order of Reference and should have allowed the Premium 
Plaintiffs to proceed to trial to challenge the findings of the special master as it would any 
other evidence presented at trial. The trial court's rejection of the Premium Plaintiffs' 
objections to the Master's report was accordingly erroneous and should be reversed by the 
this and remanded to the trial court for a trial on all issues, including the findings in the 
Master's report. 
III. T H E TRIAL C O U R T E R R E D I N D E N Y I N G T H E P R E M I U M 
PLAINTIFFS' M O T I O N T O FILE A N A M E N D E D C O M P L A I N T 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (a) provides that a party may amend a pleading after 
a responsive pleading has been filed only upon leave of the court and "leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). "P]t is well established that rule 15 
should be interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated." 
Jones p. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT App 355 ^ 16, 78 P.3d 988 (internal quotations 
omitted). "(T]he Court's ultimate goal in deciding a motion to amend is to have the real 
controversy between the parties presented, their rights determined, and the cause decided . . 
.." Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102 ^9, 104 P.3d 1242 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
In Utah courts, "the motion to amend analysis is . . . a multi-factored, flexible inquiry 
that allows trial courts the leeway to evaluate the factual circumstances and legal 
developments in each particular case." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App. 44, ]^ 
41 , 87 P.3d 734. However, there are three factors that courts generally consider when 
determining whether to grant a motion for leave to amend: "the timeliness of the motion; 
the justification given by the movant for the delay; and the resulting prejudice to the 
responding party." Id. T] 26. Here, each of these three factors weighs decisively in favor of 
granting the Premium Plaintiffs leave to amend, and the trial court erred when it denied the 
Premium Plaintiffs leave to amend its Complaint on the grounds that "[t]his case is ten years 
old" and that "[t]he new issues raised by the Amended Complaint cannot be addressed in an 
accounting issue case." (R. 6704-05). 
A. The Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to A m e n d Was Timely Fi led 
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First, the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend was timely. Explaining this factor, 
Utah courts have noted that '"motions to amend are typicaUy untimely when they are filed in 
the advanced procedural stages of the litigation process/" Swan Creek VilL Homeowners A.ss'n 
v. Warne, 2006 U T 22,1J20, 134 P.3d 1122. 
Although the initial complaint in this case was filed ten years ago, discovery was not 
completed, no summary judgment has been issued, and no trial date has been set. Even 
more importantly, the Premium Plaintiffs sought leave to amend its Complaint prior to the 
deadline for the amendment of pleadings. Thus, the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
was not untimely. 
The Premium Plaintiffs recognizes that this Court has stated: "[Rjegardless of the 
procedural posture of the case, motions to amend have typically been deemed untimely 
when they were filed several years into the litigation." Kelly, 2004 U T App. at ^30. The 
Court's rationale for this secondary part of the analysis was explained as follows: 
In such cases, the ongoing passage of time makes it increasingly 
difficult for the nonmoving party to effectively respond to the new 
allegations or claims. Parties in such circumstances are often hindered 
by witnesses who have since moved or died, by their shaky memories 
and recollections, or by documents which have since been lost or 
destroyed. 
Id at ^j31. The Premium Plaintiffs submits that this case is not typical in this regard, and 
justifies an exception from this general consideration for several reasons. 
First, the Premium Plaintiffs' Amended Consolidated Complaint arises from the same 
set of facts and under the same contracts that are central to the pending litigation. Indeed, 
the additional claims under the Amended Consolidated Complaint relate back to the 
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contractual relationships between the parties that are already at issue. As such, issues related 
to the passage of time should not bar the Premium Plaintiffs' new claims. 
Second, the new related claims should have been admitted into this case in the 
interests of judicial efficiency and economy. The number of contracts at issue, the 
understanding of the patent and technology issues, the conduct between the parties, and the 
voluminous number of records applicable to the claims should only be dealt with by one 
court and one jury. If the Premium Plaintiffs are forced to bring a new suit, then another 
court will have to revisit these same issues that have taken so long to determine in this 
proceeding, which would squander valuable judicial resources. 
Third, justice requires the amendment of the Premium Plaintiffs' Complaint. Due to 
the physical limitations of the parties involved, the Court's decision denying the Premium 
Plaintiffs leave to amend its Complaint virtually assures that the new claims will never be 
brought. The primary Plaintiff, Mr. Mr. Gilmer, died in 2006 at the age of 87, and his widow 
is in no position to bring the newly discovered related claims in new litigation. In a very real 
sense, the trial court's denial of the right to amend the consolidated complaint amounts to 
summary judgment against the Premium Plaintiffs on its related claims. 
Finally, the trial court erred when it characterized this action as one for an equitable 
accounting in denying the Premium Plaintiffs leave to amend. As previously set forth, a 
number of claims are at issue in this proceeding in addition to the Premium Plaintiffs' 
request for an accounting. Consequently, the Premium Plaintiffs' new claims should not be 
barred because they exceed the request for an accounting. 
B. T h e Premium Plaintiffs Did N o t Delay in Request ing 
Leave to File an Amended Complaint 
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In considering whether to grant a motion to amend, the court must also look to the 
reason offered for the delay in seeking to amend the pleading. This factor focuses on 
"whether the moving party had knowledge of the events that are 
sought to be added." Utah courts have generally adopted the United 
States Supreme Court's narrow rule focusing on whether the motion to 
amend was filed as the result of a dilatory motive, bad faith, or 
unreasonable neglect on the part of the movant. While the 
requirements for finding a dilatory motive, bad faith, or unreasonable 
neglect have not been expressly defined, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has correctly noted that "where the party's prior knowledge was 
minimal, or where it was instead based on suspicious or inconclusive 
evidence, the party's decision to hold off on pleading those allegations 
until reliable confirmation could be obtained should not serve as 
grounds for procedural default." 
Swan Creek Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, 2006 UT 22, ^22. 
For the past eight years, MegaDyne has persistently avoided the production of 
relevant documents. The following establish the Premium Plaintiffs' diligent efforts from 
1999 through 2007 to obtain the document relevant to its claims. 
• October 1999: Order to Compel Production of Discovery; (R. 163-
34) 
• August 2000: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order; (R. 1148-
52) 
• December 2000: the Premium Plaintiffs' Motions for Sanctions for 
Noncompliance with Discovery; (R. 1364-98) 
• December 2000: MegaDyne's Motion to Quash the Premium 
Plaintiffs' Subpoenas Duces Tecum; (R. 1440-42) 
• June 2001: Order Requiring MegaDyne's to Allow the Premium 
Plaintiffs to Review all Documentation Made Available to Special 
Master and Other Discovery Requests; (R. 1949) 
• July 2001- Protective Order issued; (R. 1973-78) 
39 
393518v.4 
• August 2001: Stipulation and Order re: the Premium Plaintiffs' 
Access to Master's Documents; (R. 1979-81) 
• October 2001: the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 
Document Production and Third Document Production Request; 
(R. 1996-98) 
• November 2001: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order; (R. 
2266-71). 
• February 2002: Order Granting the Premium Plaintiffs' Access to 
Some Requested Documents and Granting MegaDyne's Motion for 
Protective Order on Others. Deferred evidentiary hearing on 
whether special master exceeded the order of reference; (R. 2410-
11) 
• August 2002: the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions for 
Discovery Noncompliance; (R. 2606-2959) 
- oCptciiiLycr ^\J\JZS. v^ruer j^eiernng oanctions anu ^rant ing toe 
Premium Plaintiffs' Discovery; (R. 3001-05) 
• April 2003: the Premium Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery 
or Rule 37 sanctions; (R. 3110-3188) 
• July 2003: Order Compelling Discovery; (R. 3466-68) 
• May 2004: MegaDyne's Motion for Protective Order Denying 
Discovery; (R. 4400-07) 
• September 2004: Bench Ruling ordering MegaDyne's to produce 
400 sample invoices; (R. 4656) 
• September 2005: Order compelling production of 400 sample 
invoices; (R. 4724-27) 
• August 2007: Parties reached stipulation to access certain sealed 
documents from MegaDyne's Aspen Labs litigation in federal court. 
(R. 6304) 
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The Premium Plaintiffs were unaware of its new claims until it received the 
documents that it had been seeking for eight years. The above-listed events clearly 
demonstrate that any delay in this case was due to MegaDyne's refusal to cooperate in 
discovery. Had MegaDyne produced the records initially sought by the Premium Plaintiffs, 
they would have become aware of its additional claims and been able to assert its new claims 
much earlier. 
Secondly, progress was hindered by the sheer complexity of evaluating the 
documents that the Premium Plaintiffs eventually obtained. N o single source of documents 
was complete enough to establish the royalties due for the contract years. Determining the 
scope of damages required assembling and coordinating data from literally thousands of 
individual records produced from various sources and having accountants generate 
calculations from the data thus collated. The quantity of royalty units ultimately compiled 
from discovered sets of documents of individual sales and shipments of coated units 
numbered over 50,000,000. Not until these tasks were completed did the full extent of the 
Premium Plaintiffs' underpaid royalties become apparent. 
C. MegaDyne Will N o t Be Unduly Prejudiced If the Premium 
Plaintiffs Are Permitted T o Amended Their Complaint 
The question of prejudice arising from failure to provide timely notice is generally a 
question of fact, as the Utah Supreme Court has explained: 
In deciding on a motion to amend, the trial court should primarily 
consider whether granting the motion would subject the opposing 
party to unavoidable prejudice "by having an issue adjudicated for 
which he had not had time to prepare.". . . . Where the amendment 
would advance a new theory of recovery based almost entirely on facts 
already in evidence, the court should liberally allow amendment 
because the opposing party is then generally prepared to address such a 
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claim. Aurora Credit Svcs. Inc. v. Liberty West DeveL 970 P.2d 1273, 1282 
(Utah 1998). 
This Court has expounded the prejudice rule more fully, as follows. 
[A] showing of simple prejudice is not enough to support a denial of a 
motion to amend.. . . [I]n order to justify the denial of a motion to 
amend on prejudice grounds, the prejudice "must be undue or 
substantia] prejudice, since almost every amendment of a pleading will 
result in some 'practical prejudice' to the opposing party." 
Kelly 2004 U T App. at ^|31 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
The trial court denied the Premium Plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint 
that it filed prior to the deadline for the amendment of pleadings, based on the court's 
conclusion that this case is ten (10) years old and presendy solely an accounting case. As 
explained above, this case, while including a claim for accounting, also involves claims for 
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and misrepresentation. The trial court failed to 
consider the Premium Plaintiffs' existing legal claims in this action, the deadline for 
amendment of pleadings or any of the factors relevant to a determination as to the requested 
amendment. For example, the trial did not consider the fact that the new claim for violation 
of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act in the Amended Complaint are based on 
information recently obtained by the Premium Plaintiffs from a third party subpoena after 
Defendants refused to produce the information to the Premium Plaintiffs. 
Under Rule 15, a party should be permitted to amend a complaint based on newly 
discovered evidence and under the multi-factored test set forth above. Accordingly, the trial 
court erred when it denied the Premium Plaintiffs leave to amend its Complaint to allow for 
full and fair litigation of the entire controversy between the parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Lower Court misapplied Rule 53 when it struck the Premium Plaintiffs jury 
demand. Pleading legal and alternatively legal claims in the same Complaint does not justify 
eliminating the right to a jury trial. The inherent impossibility of the Master's report coupled 
with the Master's repeated failure to abide by the Order of Reference requires the rejection 
of his report. Lastly, the lower court did not apply the correct criteria in declining the 
Motion to Amend the Complaint. 
For these compelling reasons, the Master's report should be rejected, the demand for 
jury trial reinstated, and the Order denying the Motion to Amend reversed. 
DATED this 1ST day of December, 2008. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
... AtrJU, 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Scott M. Lilja 
Cassie J. Medura 
Lisa B. Bohman 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the within and foregoing 
document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 1st day of December, 2008, to the following: 
George M. Haley 
David R. Parkinson 
j . Andrew Sjoblom 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
299 South Mam Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Tabl 
DaleF. Gardiner, #1147 
Mark C. Quinn, #6782 
O'RORKE & GARDINER, LLC 
6965 Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047-6045 
Telephone: (801)569-3131 
Facsimile: (801)569-3434 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH L. FAILOR; and PREMIUM 
PLASTICS, INC., a California Corporation; 
HARVEY VAN EPPS GILMER, JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MEGADYNE MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, f.k.a. American Medical 
Products, Inc. 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF REFERENCE 
Civil No.: 980907641 
Judge: William A. Thorne 
Pursuant to Rule 53, Utah R. Civ. P., Plaintiffs' motion to appoint a national accounting 
firm to serve as a special master in this action, the Consent of Defendant, and good cause 
appearing therefor, accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Appointment. John W. Curran, of Ernst & Young, LLP, 60 East South Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, shall serve as special master in this action until further 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third ''•--''•--'^.-.irict 
m 1 2 1999 
SAL1 LAKHltLois i Y 
By. 
7U | Deputy Clerk 
order of the Court. The special master will submit an Affidavit of Impartiality 
certifying that he has not previously worked for, and has no reason to be partial 
towards, any party or attorney in this action. 
2. Compensation. The compensation to be paid to the special master shall be 
approved by the Court based upon a rate of $300.00 per hour for Mr. Curran and 
other partners of Ernst & Young, $200.00 per hour for mid-level assistants and 
$125.00 per hour for other assistants, plus reasonable expenses incurred in 
performing the master's duties. Because Mr. Curran is located primarily in the 
Seattle office of Ernst & Young, it is anticipated that he will be required to travel to 
Salt Lake City on occasion. The expenses of such travel will be absorbed by Ernst 
& Y'oung for six to eight trips during the course of Mr. Currants duties as special 
master. The expense of any further trips to Salt Lake City over and above the 
anticipated six to eight trips will be subject to further negotiation if and when they 
become necessary. All other travel expenses of the special master beyond travel 
from Seattle to Salt Lake City will be part of the special master's reasonable 
expenses to be paid by the parties. Until further order of the Court, each party shall 
timely pay one-half of the compensation to the master as it becomes due and each 
party shall also pay one-half of the special master's reasonable expenses. The 
master shall submit to the Court and counsel for both parties monthly statements 
itemizing the time and expenses incurred in this proceeding and the work 
performed. Each party shall have five (5) business days following receipt of the 
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master's monthly statement to file an objection with the Court concerning any 
amount included in the statement and, if either party objects, the objection shall be 
determined before the disputed amount is paid. The master shall not retain his 
report as security for payments. 
3. Referred Issues. The issues relating to the amount of the Defendant's products 
coated and the Defendant's coated products sold under the Agreements (attached as 
Exhibit A through Exhibit E to Plaintiffs' Complaint) are hereby referred to the 
master. 
4. Duties. The special master shall take evidence on, identify, and prepare a report to 
the Court of his findings as to, the amount of Defendant's products coated and the 
amount of Defendant's coated products sold under the Agreements. Attached to his 
report, the special master shall include transcripts of any evidentiary proceedings 
conducted by the master and copies of any exhibits submitted to the master. 
5. Powers. The master has and shall exercise the power to do all acts and take all 
measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under this 
Order. Without limiting the broad scope of the master's powers, such powers shall 
include the following: He may require the production before him of evidence upon 
all matters embraced in this reference, including the production of all books, papers, 
vouchers, documents, and writing applicable thereto, he may put witnesses under 
oath, and himself examine witnesses and call the parties to the action and examine 
them under oath provided that he shall not engage in ex parte communications with 
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either party, the parties' counsel or with any owners, employees, agents or 
representatives of any of the parties except as provided herein. The parties may 
participate in all discovery proceedings conducted by the master and shall be given 
adequate notice to sufficiently participate in any discovery proceedings. If either 
party fails to appear at the time and place established by the master, the master may 
proceed ex parte or, in his discretion, may adjourn the proceedings to a future date 
giving notice to the absent party of the adjournment. Either party may procure the 
attendance of witnesses before the master through the issuance and service of 
subpoenas as provided in Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If without 
adequate excuse a witness fails to appear or give evidence, that witness will be 
subject to punishment as for contempt and subject to the consequences, penalties, 
and remedies provided in Rules 37 and 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
determined by the Court. The parties may submit evidence to the master for his 
consideration in connection with the performance of his duties hereunder. 
6. Procedure. 
(a) WitWnJen-ftOJa^ys after the date of entry of this Order, the master shall meet 
with counsel for both parties to establish a plan for the preparation of the 
master's report; 
(b) Within sixty (60) days after the date of entry of this Order, the master shall 
report to the Court as to the status of his findings and the date on which his 
report will be completed; 
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(c) The master shall submit his report to the Court and counsel for the parties and 
each party shall have ten (10) days after receipt of the report to submit 
objections and recommendations to the master concerning its contents; 
(d) After consideration of any such objections and recommendations, the master 
shall within twenty (20) days submit his final report by filing it with the Clerk 
of the Court together with the relevant documents, testimony, and other 
evidence on which it is based, and providing a copy to counsel for each party; 
(e) Each party shall have ten (10) days after receipt of the master's final report to 
file with the Court any objections to any part of the report. Application to the 
Court for action upon the report and upon objections to the report shall be by 
motion and upon notice as described in Rule 6(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court, after hearing upon any objections, may adopt the 
report or may modify or reject the report in whole or in part or may receive 
further evidence through hearings or trial or may recommit the report to the 
master with instructions. 
DATED this ff day of Beeember, 199X. 
5 
Approved and Accepted: 
n / 
> — - _ _ , , y 
Jphn W. Curran 
Special Master 
The parties to this action hereby stipulate and consent to the appointment of John W. 
Curran of Ernst & Young, LLP, as Special Master in this proceeding and also stipulate to and 
approve the entry of this Order of Reference: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU O'RORKE & GARDINER, LLC 
/ Harold G. Christensen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Dale t. Gardiner 
Mark C. Quinn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document ORDER 
OF REFERENCE was hand-delivered on the c*7 day of January, 1999 to the 
following: 
Harold G. Christensen 
Rodney R. Parker 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
L . J.. • ' /— • -
SPECMAST.ORD 
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By. 
~nss SISTRIC? mmt 
Third Judicial District 
MAY - 6 2008 
vv ^TyftALT LAKH COUNTY 
DGptityClefT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH L. FAILOR, et.al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MEGADYNE MEDICAL PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 98 090 7641 CN 
JUDGE L.A. DEVER 
This matter came on for hearing for arguments on pending motions The motions 
are noted as: 
1. Defendant's motion to strike jury demand of the Plaintiffs. 
2 Plaintiff's objection to the final report of the Special Master. 
3 Plaintiff's renewed motion to depose the Special Master. 
4. Plaintiff's motion for an evidentiary hearing on report of Special Master. 
5. Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint. 
The Plaintiff's were present and represented by Dale F. Gardiner. The 
Defendant was represented by George Haley. The Court having considered the 
arguments and memoranda of the parties, rules as follows: 
1. This case involves an accounting issue. The parties previously agreed 
that a special master was to be appointed and present his report to the Court. 
Accounting is an equitable remedy and the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury on the 
issue. Defendant's motion to strike the jury demand is granted. 
2. Plaintiff's objections to the method of assembling the report of the 
Special Master are noted. The Court has previously rejected the Plaintiff's objections as 
they relate to the Special Master's exceeding the scope of the Order of Reference, 
contacts with the parties, the filing of a work plan and the method of obtaining 
documents from the Defendant. The Court, once again; denies these objections. 
3. Plaintiff's request to depose the Special Master has previously been 
denied. The Plaintiff has presented no new grounds for the Court to revisit this denial. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Depose the Special Master is denied. 
4. Plaintiff's Motion for a Hearing on the Report of the Special Master. 
The Utah R. Civ. P. 53 provides that the Court is to accept the Report of the Special 
Master's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. An objection to the report 
has been made accompanied by a request for a hearing. Based upon the allegations of 
error coupled with a report from the Plaintiff's expert, the Court determines that it is 
proper to grant the Plaintiff's request for a hearing on the Report of the Special Master. 
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The Court has some concerns about the scope of such a hearing. Therefore, it directs 
that the parties meet, agree to a proposed format and consult with the Court to finalize 
the procedures to be followed. 
5 Plaintiffs Motion to file an Amended Complaint is denied. This case is 
ten years old. The new issues raised by the Amended Complaint cannot be addressed 
in an accounting issue case. If the Plaintiff's desire to raise these new issues, they will 
have to do it in a separate action. 
THIS IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT. 
Dated this 6,h day of May, 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, 
postage prepaid, on the llP day May, 2008, to the following: 
George M. Haley 
J. Andrew Sjoblom 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP 
299 South Main Street, Ste 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5800 
Dale F. Gardiner 
VANCOTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
36 South State Street Ste 1900 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
John W. Curran, Special Master 
ERNST & YOUNG, LLP 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3500 
Seattle, WA 98104 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo--
JQj ~ry 
*J> 
1
 < % '"^ 
•?>. tf 
Kenneth L. Failor; 
Premium Plastics, Inc.; 
and Mary Gilmer, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Megadyne Medical Products, 
Inc., fka American Medical 
Products, Inc. 
Respondents. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20080459-CA 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 7 2008 
Deputy Clerk 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and McHugh 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is GRANTED. This court will notify the parties upon 
setting a briefing schedule. 
DATED th is ^ day of June, 2001 
FOR THE COURT: 
6 Trie 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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American Medical Products, liicorjjondcd 
h j u ' s i , , I | , » S i , , , i • \ | m i i \ i i ih s 11 n , • i s n I • ' » • > » » . . * 
A p r i l 20 , 1988 
Mr. Kenneth L. Failor 
3434 West 12600 South 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
Re: Compensation Agreement 
Dear Ken: 
The purpose of this letter is to rr.ei 
agreement regarding the payment of compensation to you by American 
Medical Products, Inc. ("AMP") and certain other matters. The 
agreement we have reached is as follows: 
1. Term and Scope. This Agreement shall commence upon the 
execution hereof by you, and shall continue for a term of nine (9) 
years thereafter, unless earlier terminated as set forth in 
Paragraph 7 hereof. The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that 
this Agreement and the compensation to be paid to you shall apply 
only to those products of AMP commonly known as the "E/Z Clean 
Cautery Tip1', the "E/Z Clean Needle Tip", the "E/Z Clean Extended 
Blade Tip" and the "E/Z" Clean Ball Electrode" (collectively, the 
"AMP Products")• The parties hereto specifically agree that this 
Agreement shall supersede, cancel and terminate that certain 
Agreement, dated as of May 12, 1987, by and between AMP, you and KF 
Manufacturing; provided, however, that you agree to continue to 
assist AMP in facilitating the manufacture of the AMP Products until 
the definitive exclusive manufacturing agreement referred to ir> 
Paragraph 4 hereof has been executed. 
2. Compensation. AMP shall pay you compensation according to 
the following schedule for each unit of AMP Products actually sold t™ 
customers of AMP during the term hereof: 
Mr. Kenneth L. Failor 
April 20, 1988 
Page 2 
Years 1-3 $0.08/unit 
Year 4 0.07/unit 
Year 5 0.06/unit 
Years 6-9 0.05/unit 
Such compensation shall be payable in arrears, and will be paid on a 
monthly basis as, if and when AMP receives payment for the AMP 
Products from its customers. 
3. Inspection of Books and Records. Upon reasonable notice, 
during normal business hours, and in the offices and presence of an 
officer or representative of AMP, you shall be entitled to inspect 
those books and records of AMP pertaining to actual sales of the AMP 
Products to customers of AMP to ensure compliance herewith. 
4. Release of PPI. In consideration of the compensation to be 
paid hereunder, you hereby agree to unconditionally release and 
discharge in writing PPI from all of its obligations under that 
certain Manufactures License Agreement dated as of , 
1987 by and between PPI and KF Manufacturing, the parties hereto 
intending that such Agreement be superseded, cancelled and terminated 
hereby. Contemporaneously with the execution hereof, you shall 
execute and deliver to the attorney of AMP the form of Release 
attached hereto as Exhibit A# which shall be held by such attorney 
pending the negotiation of a definitive exclusive manufacturing 
agreement by and between AMP and PPI. 
5. Reaffirmation. You hereby specifically reaffirm to AMP 
that you have assigned to AMP all of your right, title and interest 
in and to the AMP Products, the process whereby the non-stick surface 
coating is applied to the AMP Products (the "Process") and all patent 
and trademark applications made regarding the AMP Products and the 
Process, and any and all derivatives, improvements and modifications 
to the AMP Products and the Process. Henceforth, your only interest 
with respect to such matters and AMP shall be the receipt of the 
compensation set forth in Paragraph 2 hereof. 
6. Confidentiality. You hereby specifically reaffirm your 
obligations of confidentiality to AMP as set forth in that certain 
Agreement of Confidentiality dated as of March 20, 1987, by and 
between AMP and you. 
Mr. Kenneth L. Failor 
April 20, 1988 
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7. Termination and Buy-Out Provision. This Agreement may be 
terminated prior to the lapse of the term set forth in Paragraph 1 
hereof in the event that all of the issued and outstanding common 
stock of AMP is bought by any other person or entity. In such an 
event, AMP shall exert best efforts to cause any such purchaser to 
assume all of the obligations of AMP hereunder. If such purchaser 
does not agree to assume such obligations, you shall receive the 
present value of the amount resulting from the operation of the 
following formula: 
(AMVJ(COMP)(y) 
where 
AMV = the aggregate average monthly volume of AMP Products 
sold during the twelve month period immediately 
preceding such sale of AMP; 
COMP = the prevailing rate of compensation payable to you 
during the year in which any such sale of AMP occurs; 
and 
y « the number of years remaining in the term hereof from 
the date of any such sale of AMP, as determined by the 
following schedule: 
Years 1-4 
Year 5 
Year 6 
Year 7 
Year 8 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
= 5 
= 4 
= 3 
= 2 
= 1 
the parties hereto understanding that the provisions 
of this Section 7 shall be inapplicable to any sale of 
AMP occurring in the final twelve months hereof. 
The amount payable pursuant to this Section 7, if any, shall be paid 
by AMP as, if and when AMP receives the proceeds of any such sale 
from its purchaser. 
8. Assistance to AMP. You agree to assist AMP from time to 
time in facilitating and preserving the relationship between AMP and 
PPI, to ensure that the manufacturing process of the AMP Products is 
accomplished in an orderly, timely and workmanlike manner. 
Mr. Kenneth L. Failor 
April 20, 1988 
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9. Entire Agreement. This Agreement and all exhibits hereto 
constitute the complete and entire agreement between the parties 
hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. The execution and 
delivery hereof shall not constitute a waiver or relinquishment on 
the part of AMP of any of its rights relating to any matters giving 
rise to this Agreement. No statement or agreement, oral or written, 
made prior to or contemporaneously with the execution hereof and no 
course of dealing or practice by either party hereto prior to or 
after the execution hereof shall vary or modify the written terms of 
this Agreement. 
10. Amendment. This Agreement may be amended only by a written 
document or instrument signed by the parties, stating that such 
document is intended to amend the provisions of this Agreement. 
11. Notices. Any notices, requests, demands or other 
communications permitted or required to be made shall be delivered 
personally, by telegram, telex or by certified U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, at the following addresses: 
To AMP: American Medical Products, Inc. 
6202 Stratler Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attn: Matthias R. Sansom 
Vice President 
With copy to: Jeffrey D. Wilson, Esq. 
Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & 
Minick, P.C. 
5400 Renaissance Tower 
Dallas, Texas 75270 
To Failor: Kenneth L. Failor 
3434 West 12600 South 
Riverton, Utah 84107 
With copy to: Thomas D. Neeleman, Esq. 
1061 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
12. Assignment. You shall not assign this Agreement or any of 
your rights or obligations hereunder without the express prior 
written consent of AMP. 
Mr. Kenneth L. Failor 
April 20, 1988 
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13. Transactional Expenses. Each party hereto shall bear its 
own costs and expenses incurred in connection with the preparation, 
negotiation, execution and delivery of this Agreement. 
14. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit 
of your heirs, successors and assigns. 
15. Governing Law. This Agreement is executed in, performable 
at least in part in and shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
Your execution, in the space provided below, shall evidence that 
you have read, understood and agreed to be bound by the provisions 
hereof. Please execute the three (3) copies of this Letter Agreement 
and the Release attached thereto as Exhibit A, and promptly return 
two (2) executed copies to the undersigned. 
Sincerely, 
AMERICAN MEDICAL. PRODUCTS, INC 
:5sSk^< ^ -*>r-
Matthias R. Sansom, 
Vice President 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED: April ^ Q , 1988 
KENNETH L. FAILOR, Individually 
1<-£*-fP 
B y : / [ j ^ _ _ 
mneth L. Fa i lo r , 
Pres ident 
^ — ^ ^ > 
282:D041388AA.00 
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Exhibit A 
RELEASE 
For value received, the undersigned hereby 
releases and discharges Premium Plastics, Inc. 
officers, director and shareholders from all of 
to the undersigned pursuant to that certain Manu 
Agreement by and between the undersigned and PPI 
, 1987, relating to the manufa 
electro-surgical and medical instruments by PPI 
American Medical Products, Inc. ("AMP"); shal 
object to or in any way interfere with th 
preparation, execution and delivery of an exclusi 
agreement between AMP and PPI; and acknowledges a 
PPI and its officers, directors and shareholde 
further obligation or liability of any nature wha 
undersigned. 
unconditionally 
("PPI") and its 
its obligations 
factures License 
, dated as of 
cture of certain 
on behalf of 
1 permit and not 
e negotiation, 
ve manufacturing 
nd affirms that 
rs shall have no 
tsoever to the 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned 
delivered this Release as of April , 1988. 
has executed and 
KENNETH L. FAILOR, 
Individually 
2 ^ : 
-7 -j/ r 
KF MANUFAC;fU#ING, INC. 
By; -JL t,u*viA+_ 
Kenneth L. Fadlor, 
President 
/- ** -fp 
y-^^-// 
?82:D041388AA.OO 
)41988shll 
ADDENDUM TO COMPENSATION AGREEMENT 
This addendum dated this ^1^ day of April, 1988, pertains 
to that certain Compensation Agreement ("The Agreement") dated 
April 20, 1988, by and between American Medical Products Inc. 
("AMP") and Kenneth L. Failor and KF Manufacturing ("KFM"). 
NOTWITHSTANDING paragraph 9 of the agreement and pursuant to 
paragraph 10 of the agreement and in consideration of the mutual 
promises contained therein the parties additionally agree as 
follows: 
1) Kenneth L. Failor or KFM shall at all times be 
considered independent contractors for the purpose of this 
agreement. 
2) As a condition of the pending exclusive manufacturing 
agreement to be entered into between AMP and PPI referenced in 
paragraph 4 of the agreement, AMP shall require that PPI Pro-
vide Kenneth L. Failor with invoice copies detailing all 
purchases of AMP products by AMP. 
3) For the purposes of clarification, the following shall 
be included in Paragraph 7. 
a. the discount rate to be applied to the buy-out funds 
shall be 6.5% (six and one-half percent.) 
b. for the purposes of calculating AMV, the monthly 
volume during the initial 12 months of the contract 
period shall be considered to be the greater of 
125,000 units per month or the number of units 
actually sold. 
4) The parries hereby relinquish, release, and agree to 
hold each the other harmless from any causes of action real or 
imagined which may have arisen as a result of or in connection 
with past dealings between the parties. 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED: April Z/ / 1988, 
KENNETH L. FA1L0R, Individually 
KF MANUFACTURING 
By : 
^ i Kenneth L. Failor 
President 
c^ /-z/-rf 
AMERX^N MEDICAL PRODUCTS^, INC. 
Matthias R. Sansorn 
Vice President 
ADDENDUM TO COMPENSATION AGREEMENT 
This addendum dated this day of April, 1988, pertains 
to that certain Compensation Agreement ("The Agreement") dated 
April 20, 1988, by and between American Medical Products Inc. 
("AMP") and Kenneth L. Failor and KF Manufacturing ("KFM"). 
NOTWITHSTANDING paragraph 9 of the agreement and pursuant to 
paragraph 10 of the agreement and in consideration of the mutual 
promises contained therein the parties additionally agree as 
follows: 
1) Kenneth L. Failor or KFM shall at all times be 
considered independent contractors for the purpose of this 
agreement. 
2) As a condition of the pending exclusive manufacturing 
agreement to be entered into between AMP and PPI referenced in 
paragraph 4 of the agreement, AMP shall require that PPI Pro-
vide Kenneth L. Failor with invoice copies detailing all 
purchases of AMP products by AMP. 
3) For the purposes of. clarification, the following shall 
be included in Paragraph 7. 
a. the discount rate to be applied to the buy-out funds 
shall be 6.5% (six and one-half percent.) 
b. for the purposes of calculating AMV, the monthly 
volume during the initial 12 months of the contract 
period shall be considered to be tie greater of 
125,000 units per month or the number of jnits 
actually sold. 
4) The parties hereby relinquish, release, and agree to 
hold each the other harmless from any causes of action real or 
imagined which may have arisen as a result of or in connection 
with past dealings between the parties. 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED: April , 1988. 
KENNETH L. FAILOR, Individually 
KF MANUFACTURING 
By: 
Kenneth L. Failor 
President 
AMERICAN MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. 
By: 
Matthias R. Sansom 
Vice President 
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EXCLUSIVE PRODUCT COATING AGREEMENT 
THIS EXCLUSIVE PRODUCT COATING AGREEMENT is entered into as 
of the 1st day of June, 1988, by and between American Medical 
Products, Inc., a Utah corporation ("AMP"), and Premium Plastics, 
Inc., a California corporation ("PPI"). 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, AMP has conceived and developed the concept of 
applying a non-stick surface (the "Coating") to certain electro-
surgical instruments used in performing certain surgical 
procedures (the "Process Technology"), has developed such coated 
electro-surgical instruments (the "AMP Products") for marketing 
purposes and has applied for patents (the "Patents") with respect 
to both the Process Technology and the AMP Products; 
WHEREAS, AMP has consulted with PPI with respect to the 
coating of the AMP Products in commercial quantities; 
WHEREAS, PPI is capable of coating the AMP Products in 
commercial quantities for AMP; 
WHEREAS, AMP desires to engage and employ PPI, and PPI 
desires to accept such engagement. as the exclusive product 
coater of the AMP Products for and on behalf of AMP, to apply the 
Coating to the AMP Products by means of the Process Technology; 
and 
WHEREAS, AMP and PPI have determined that such engagement is 
in their respective and mutual best interests, and that this 
Agreement should supersede, cancel and terminate all previous 
understandings and arrangements with respect to the subject 
matter hereof. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and 
the mutual covenants and promises set forth herein, and for other 
good and valuable consideration, the delivery, receipt and 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto 
agree as follows: 
1. Grant of Exclusive Product Coating Rights. Subject to 
the terms and conditions set forth herein, AMP hereby engages and 
employs PPI, and PPI hereby accepts such engagement and 
employment, as the only person authorized to apply the Coating to 
the AMP Products by means of the Process Technology during the 
term hereof. Upon receipt of an order or proposed order, AMP 
shall notify PPI of the tentative delivery date to PPI and the 
desired completion date for applying the Coating to the AMP 
Products. PPI will acknowledge the best and fastest delivery 
date that it can meet. In consideration of such exclusive 
employment and engagement, PPI shall exert best efforts in good 
faith to satisfy on a timely basis the delivery dates requested 
by AMP and its customers. PPI shall not apply the Coating or use 
the Process Technology (or any subsequently-developed refinements 
of either of them) to electro-surgical cautery instruments for 
the benefit of any person or entity other than AMP without the 
express written consent of AMP, which consent may be withheld in 
the sole and absolute discretion of AMP. Nothing herein shall be 
construed to limit the ability of PPI to apply coating materials 
for other products that are not electro-surgical cautery 
instruments. 
2. Term. Unless earlier terminated as provided herein, 
the initial term of this Agreement shall commence as of the date 
first written above, and shall continue in full force and effect 
for a period of ten (10) years therefrom. Thereafter, this 
Agreement shall be deemed to have been automatically renewed and 
extended under the same provisions hereof for an additional, 
successive period of ten (10) years unless notice is given in 
writing thirty (30) days prior to the lapse of such initial term 
by either party evidencing the intent of such party not to renew 
and extend the term hereof. 
3. Compensation to PPI. 
(a) The full and sole compensation to which PPI is 
entitled for coating the AMP Products under this Agreement 
shall, for all of the AMP Products identified below that are 
actually received by AMP pursuant hereto, be calculated as 
follows: 
(i) For volume of less than 10,000 units per 
month: 
E/Z Clean Cautery Tip - AD Cents/Tip 
E/Z Clean Needle Tip - A 0 Cents/Tip 
E/Z Clean Extended 
Blade Electrode 70 Cents/Electrode 
E/Z Clean Ball Electrode - 45 Cents/Electrode 
(ii) For volume greater than 10,000 but less than 
125,000 units per month: 
E/Z Clean Cautery Tip - 3 3 Cents/Tip 
E/Z Clean Needle Tip - 3 7 Cents/Tip 
E/Z Clean Extended 
Blade Electrode - 6 6 Cents/Electrode 
E/Z Clean Ball Electrode - ^3 Cents/Electrode 
1
 (i i'i) For volume greater than 125,000 units per 
month: 
E/Z Clean Cautery Tip - 2 5 Cents/Tip 
E/Z Clean Needle Tip - 2 8 Cents/Tip 
E/Z Clean Extended 
Blade Electrode - 5 3 Cents/Electrode 
E/Z Clean Ba^l ^ Electrode - 3 3 Cents/Electrode 
provided, movever, that the compensation applicable to the 
E/Z Clean Extended Blade Electrode and the* E/Z Clean Ball 
Electrode set forth above shall be only for the first three 
(3) months after the commencement of production thereof, to 
enable the resolution of certain technical production 
difficulties, the parties hereto agreeing that the level of 
compensation established at the end of such three (3)-month 
period shall apply until the first annual review of such 
compensation referred to in Subsection (b) below, so that 
thereafter the compensation relating to all of the AMP 
Products will be reviewed at the same time. PPI agrees that 
it shall furnish duplicate copies of all such invoices to 
Kenneth L. Failor. 
(b) The parties hereto agree that they shall in good 
faith review such compensation on the first annual 
anniversary hereof (and at each annual anniversary 
thereafter throughout the term hereof), and shall, at each 
such time, adjust such compensation as the parties hereto 
may mutually agree. If no agreement with respect to such 
compensation is reached after thirty (30) days after such 
anniversary, this Agreement may be terminated by either AMP 
or PPI. The parties hereto expressly understand and agree 
that nothing in this Agreement is intended or shall be 
construed as a grant of any right, title or interest to PPI 
in or to the Process Technology as it relates to the AMP 
Products, the AMP Products or the Patents, or of any equity 
interest in AMP. 
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(c) The AMP Products shall be shipped FOB Paramount, 
California or, in the event the production and coating 
facilities of PPI are relocated, FOB Plant. Shipping costs 
for the AMP Products to and from PPI shall be the sole 
responsibility of AMP. Payment of all invoices submitted by 
PPI to AMP shall be on the terms "Net Due End of Month 
Proximate." There shall be a minimum order charge of Forty 
Dollars ($40.00) per invoice. 
4. Relation of the Parties. PPI shall at all times during 
the term hereof have the status of an independent cQntractor. 
Nothing herein shall be construed to create a relationship of 
principal and agent or of master and servant between AMP and PPI, 
or create any liability in either party for the acts or omissions 
of the other, or grant any right to either party to commit the 
other to any obligation to anyone else. 
5. Volume Requi rements. PPI acknowledges and agrees that, 
as the exclusive product coater of the AMP Products, it shall 
timely and in a workmanlike manner coat that quantity of AMP 
Products as AMP and PPI shall specify from time to time, PPI 
understanding that the timetable for such product coating may 
change from time to time, and that time is of the essence in this 
Agreement. PPI shall exert best efforts in good faith and shall 
take all necessary and proper steps from time to time to ensure 
that any and all such timetables are satisfied. tfhere shall be 
no minimum quantity requirements applicable to this Agreement; 
provided, however, that AMP shall pay the minimum order charge 
specified in Section 3(c) hereof per run of the AMP Products. In 
the event that PPI is unable to satisfy any such timetables, AMP 
shall be entitled, at its sole and exclusive option, to retain 
the services of other persons or entities to the extent necessary 
to timely satisfy the quantity requirements of AMP, and PPI shall 
cooperate with AMP and such other person or entity in any such 
event. 
6. The Process Technology. Immediately upon the execution 
and delivery of this Agreement, PPI shall furnish to AMP a full, 
precise, complete and detailed written copy of the Process 
Technology (including, without limitation, the detailed 
sequential steps involved in successfully utilizing the Process 
Technology and the ingredients or materials used in connection 
therewith). PPI acknowledges that the concept of applying the 
Coating to the AMP Products by means of the Process Technology is 
a proprietary asset of AMP as it applies to the AMP Products, and 
that all information not in the public domain relating to such 
concept shall be surrendered to AMP upon the termination of this 
Agreement or upon the death or incapacity of Mr. Gilmer, 
whichever occurs earlier. PPI and Mr. Gilmer agree to cooperate 
with AMP to any extent that may be necessary to augment or 
perfect the applications for the Patents, and AMP agrees to 
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reimburse PPl for reasonable costs and expenses incurred in 
providing such assistance, if any. 
7. Acquisition of PPI by AMP. PPI acknowledges that AMP 
has expressed an interest in acquiring PPI. The matter of any 
such acquisition shall be the subject of future negotiations and 
agreements by and between AMP and Harvey Van Epps Gilmer, Jr., 
his successors, heirs and assigns. 
8. Events of Default. A material breach of any of the 
terms, conditions, obligations or performances of this Agreement, 
or a succession of such breaches which are not of themselves 
material but have a cumulative effect that constitutes a material 
breach hereof shall, unless cured within thirty (30) days of the 
receipt of written notice thereof, constitute an event of default 
hereunder, and shall entitle the non-defaulting party to 
(i) pursue any applicable legal and equitable remedies, including 
specific performance, incidental and consequential damages and 
the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees; and (ii) in its sole 
and absolute discretion, terminate this Agreement. For purposes 
of this Section 8, a material breach of this Agreement shall be 
defined to include, but is not limited to, (x) the failure of PPI 
to satisfy the timeliness, quality or volume requirements of AMP, 
(y) the failure of the representation and warranty of PPI set 
forth in Section 14(f) hereof to be true anc\ correct in all 
material respects at any time during the term hereof and (z) the 
bankruptcy or insolvency of PPI. All of the rights, remedies and 
powers of the parties hereunder shall be deemed cumulative and 
not exclusive of any other rights, remedies and powers available 
at law or in equity. 
9. Conf identiality. 
(a) PPI shall not disclose the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement, its relationship with or identity of AMP, or 
any information regarding the Coating or the Process 
Technology as they relate to AMP Products, the AMP Products, 
the Patents, other proprietary information of AMP, know-how, 
sketches, formulae, reports, processes, drawings, notes, 
technical expertise, technical or non-technical data, 
engineering or design, marketing or sale information, 
programs or any translations, copies or reproductions 
thereof to any person or entity under any circumstances 
whatsoever without the express prior written consent of AMP, 
which consent may be withheld in the sole and absolute 
discretion of AMP. 
(b) All of the information described in Subsection (a) 
above that is in the possession of PPI during the term 
hereof shall be plainly and conspicuously marked as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" by PPI and shall be preserved and protected 
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by means of such reasonable and prudent precautions, 
safeguards and security measures as are necessary in the 
circumstances including, but not limited to, (i) restriction 
of public access to the premises of PPI where (A) such 
information is kept or stored, (B) the Coating and the 
Process Technology is used to coat the AMP Products; and 
(C) the AMP Products are stored prior to shipment to AMP; 
(ii) execution and delivery to PPI (with copies to AMP) of 
confidentiality agreements by each employee or agent of PPI; 
and (iii) reasonable and prudent steps to ensure the 
security of the premises of PPI both during $nd after 
business hours; and (iv) all other necessary and proper 
precautions and safeguards to avoid any possible deliberate 
or inadvertent disclosure of such information to any person 
or entity. 
(c) The obligation of confidentiality set forth in 
this Section 9 shall survive the termination of this 
Agreement for a period of five (5) years. 
10. Force Majeure. No failure or omission by either AMP or 
PPI in the performance of any obligation hereunder shall be 
deemed a breach of this Agreement or create any liability for 
damages if such failure or omission shall arise from any cause 
beyond the control or influence of either AMP or PPI, including 
the action of or compliance with any laws, rule's, regulations, 
orders or decrees by any governmental authority prohibiting the 
use of the Process Technology or the Coating or its constitutent 
chemical elements for the coating of electro-surgical instruments 
or otherwise or the revocation of any requisite approvals, 
licenses, permits or consents relating to the Coating, the 
Process Technology, the Patents or the AMP Products, or caused by 
any natural disaster, civil unrest, act of war or labor dispute. 
11. Trademarks and Tradenames of AMP. Nothing herein shall 
be construed as the grant of any right, title, interest, license 
or permission in or for the use by PPI of any of the trademarks, 
tradenames, service marks or logos of AMP in connection with any 
aspect of the business of PPI without the express prior written 
consent of AMP, which consent may be withheld in the sole and 
absolute discretion of AMP. 
12. The Patents. PPI understands and acknowledges that 
(i) AMP has applied for patents covering both the AMP Products 
and the Process Technology; (ii) such applications are presently 
pending; (iii) if granted, the Patents will be the sole and 
absolute property of AMP; and (iv) nothing herein shall be 
construed as the grant to PPI of any right, title or interest in 
or to the Patents. PPI hereby agrees to cooperate with and 
assist AMP as needed to more fully perfect such applications and 
shall comply with any request for information made by AMP in 
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connection therewith. AMP shall reimburse any reasonable 
expenses incurred by PPI in providing such assistance, if any. 
13. Assignment. PPI shall not assign, in whole or in part, 
this Agreement or any monies or other rights, benefits or 
obligations hereunder without the prior written consent of AMP, 
which consent may be withheld in the sole and absolute discretion 
of AMP. Any assignment as to which such prior written consent 
has not been given by AMP shall be null and void. No assignment 
of this Agreement by reason of the acquisition of PPI by another 
person or entity shall be made unless such other person.or entity 
provides satisfactory assurances to AMP of its ability to perform 
the provisions of this Agreement and executes and delivers a copy 
of this Agreement to AMP. The acceptance of any such assurances 
shall be at the sole and absolute discretion of AMP. 
14. Representations and Warranties of PPI. In addition to 
those representations and warranties set forth in Section 7 
hereof, PPI hereby represents, certifies and warrants to AMP 
that: 
(a) PPI is a corporation duly organized, validy 
existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of 
California; 
(b) The execution and delivery by PPI of this 
Agreement has been duly and validy authorized by all 
requisite corporate action, and PPI has all requisite power 
and authority to perform its obligations, duties and 
liabi1it ies hereunder; 
(c) Neither the execution and delivery of this 
Agreement nor the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated herein, nor compliance with the terms hereof 
will conflict with, result in a breach of, constitute a 
default under or violate the terms of the Articles of 
Incorporation or Bylaws of PPI, or any law, rule, 
regulation, judgment, decree, contract, agreement or order 
to which PPI is a party or by which PPI or any of its assets 
are bound; 
(d) None of the employees of PPI are represented by 
any union or subject to any collective bargaining agreement; 
(e) PPI is in compliance with all applicable federal, 
state and local laws, ordinances, rules and regulations with 
respect to the business conducted by it and the ownership of 
its assets; 
(f) The authority and right of PPI to use and apply 
the Coating and the constituent chemical elements thereof 
remains in full force and effect, and has not been revoked 
by any person or entity having proprietary rights thereto 
through which PPI has received its right and authority, the 
parties hereto intending that the loss or revocation of any 
such authority and right from any such person or entity 
shall constitute an event of default hereunder; and 
(g) This Agreement constitutes the valid and binding 
obligation of PPI, enforceable against PPI in accordance 
with the terms hereof, except as such enforcement may be 
limited by any applicable bankruptcy, reorganization, 
insolvency, moratorium or other laws affecting creditors' 
rights generally. 
15. Representations and Warranties of AMP. AMP hereby 
represents, certifies and warrants that: 
(a) AMP is a corporation duly organized, validy 
existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of 
Utah; 
(b) The execution and delivery by AMP of this 
Agreement has been duly and validy authorized by all 
requisite corporate action, and AMP has all requisite power 
and authority to perform its obligations, duties and 
1iabi1ities hereunder; 
(c) Neither the execution and delivery of this 
Agreement nor the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated herein, nor compliance with the terms hereof 
will conflict with, result in a breach of, constitute a 
default under or violate the terms of the Articles of 
Incorporation or Bylaws of AMP, or any law, rule, 
regulation, judgment, decree, contract, agreement or order 
to which AMP is a party or by which AMP or any of its assets 
are bound; and 
(d) This Agreement constitutes the valid and binding 
obligation of AMP, enforceable against PPI in accordance 
with the terms hereof, except as such enforcement may be 
limited by any applicable bankruptcy, reorganization, 
insolvency/ moratorium or other laws affecting creditors' 
rights generally. 
16. Inspections by AMP. PPI shall permit the 
representatives of AMP to visit and tour the premises of PPI and 
inspect the AMP Products, during normal business hours, upon 
reasonable notice. 
17. Quality Control. PPI shall establish, implement and 
enforce such standards, procedures and inspections of quality 
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c 01 itrc 1 as are r tecessary to ensure that the AMP Products coated 
by PPI are of first quality and are being coated in a workmanlike 
manner. AMP shall have the right, exercisable i 1 i Its sole ai id 
absolute discretion, to reject or revoke acceptance of any AMP 
Products not satisfying its specifications or quality control 
standards. 
1 8 , Inteqrat ion . This Agreement . - 11uteL I I.... comp 1 eL^ 
and entire agreement between the _ *ereto and is intended 
to supersede any and all prior agreements with respect to 
subject matter hereof. No other previous statement, agreement 
understanding, oral oi wi ittei I, ai id r IO course of dealing •. r 
practice by either party hereto shall vary or modify the wr* 
terms hereof. The parties hereto agree and intend that this 
Agreement shall supersede, cancel and terminate -that certain 
Exclusive Manufactures Agreement by and between PPI and KF 
Manufacturing, and PPI hereby acknowledges receipt of a written 
Release *ith r-spe"', (hereto from Kenneth L. Failor and KF 
M a n u f a r •'.-:; - r • * i e < i h e r e 11 > a s B x h i b i t A. 
Am e n d m e n t s , 'If LIS Agreement may be amended oi ily uy 
written document or instrument signed by the parties hereto, 
stating that such document or instrument is intended to amend * 
p r o v i s i o n s h e r e o f 
20. Not ices. Any notices,
 r eq u e s t s^ demands or other 
communications permitted or required to be made pursuant to this 
Agreement shall be delivered personally, by telegram, telex or by 
certified U.S. mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, 
at the following addresses: 
• r"o AMF • i American Medica 1 Products, Inc. 
6202 Stratler Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Matthias R. Sansom, 
Vice President 
wi Jeffrey D. Wilson, Esq. 
Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest 
& Minick, P.C 
5400 Renaissance Tower 
1201 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75270 
To PPI; Premium Plastics, Ii ic. 
15542 Vermont Avenue 
Par amou n t, Ca1i f orn i a 90723 
Attention: Harvey Van Epps Gilmer, ,I 
9 
To Kenneth L. Failoi 
(duplicate copies of 
invoices only) 
Mrm Kenneth L. Failor 
3434 West 12600 South 
Rivei toi i, Utah 84 06 5 
21 . Binding Effect. I" I i e p i o v i s i o n s o f 11 i i s Agreement 
sha11
 # whether or not so expressed, be bIndi i ig upor i and si la 1 1 
inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by and against the 
parties hereto and their respective successors, assigns and 
h e i r s 
INIi a c t i o n t \r • n -jr i i u p > "V" I "it1 
i «i i i) " " h e c o veil a n t s , c o nd i i i o n s 
2 2 . N O 1II "I M I A C U r r o x v c i . 
parties hereto with respect 
or obligations hereof shall constitute a waiver or relinquishment 
for the future of any right, covenant, condition or option 
contained herein.unless there exists a wi itten waiver of rights 
duly executed by AMP and PP1. Any waiver of performance in one 
instance shall not constitute a waiver in any other instance 
whether before or after the execution of such waiver", and any 
such waived provisions sha] 1 - o - - - - -
 n full f orre ~md c f f erf i n 
al1 other r\rcumstances. 
c< 
Governing Law, This Agreement shall be governed by 
in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto havt ^r,.u*ed .,.ri-
del ivered thi s Agreemer it as c f tl :ie date ^nH VP/ : 
above. 
AMERICAN MEDICAL PRODUCT? TMC 
By ^S3CT^>^^ V- • __}>^=Aw^r-
Matthias R. Sansom 
Vice President 
PREMIUM PLASTICS, INC 
By 
Harvey \Atfn Epps Gilmer, JP^y 
Preside/* 
u 
282:D032288D.00 
060188shll 
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AGREEMENT 
v* 
vv This Agreement is made and entered into this czX L* day 
\ V \ ^ ^ L J C A A , 1 9 i ^ by and between MegaDyne Medical Products. Inc., a Utah 
corporation and prior to a name change known as American Medical Products, Inc. 
(MegaDyne), and Premium Plastics, Inc., a California corporation (PPI) and Harvey 
Van Epps Gilmer Jr., an individual (Gilmer) 
WHEREAS, MegaDyne has conceived and developed the concept of applying a Teflon 
non-stick surface (Coating) to certain electro-surgical instruments used in performing 
certain surgical procedures (the Process Technology), has developed such coated 
electro-surgical instruments (the MegaDyne Products) for marketing purposes and has 
received the patents (the Patents) for both the Process Technoloov an l MegaDyne 
Products, and 
WHEREAS, MegaDyne and PPI previously entered into an agreement as of the 1st 
day of June, 1988 (the 1988 Agreement), pursuant to which PPI was granted and 
accepted, under the terms and conditions of the 1988 Agreement, rights as the exclusive 
product coater of MegaDyne Products using the Process Technology, and 
WHEREAS, Gilmer is president and sole or inajority shareholder of PPI, and 
*o sell his business, and 
WHEREAS, MegaDyne desires to insure the availability of Glli nei to provide 
technical support and consultation services to MegaDyne after the sale of PPI or such 
earlier dates as hereinafter provided, and 
WHEREAS, PPI and Gilmer, pursuant to the 1988 Agreement and performance 
thereunder, have been provided with and have obtained information, knowledge and 
experience in connection with MegaDyne Products, the Process Technology and the 
Patents, and 
WHEREAS, MegaDyne desires to assemble a plant, equipment, knowledge and 
technology with which to itself apply the Coating to MegaDyne Products by means of the 
Process Technology and desires to engage Gilmer as a consultant, upon the terms and 
conditions contained herein, to provide MegaDyne with direction, knowledge, expertise 
and experience to apply the Coating with the same expertise and competence heretofore 
accomplished by PPI, and 
WHEREAS, all parties desire and are in agreement that the 1988 Agreement be 
modified and continued as hereinafter provided, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises, the terms and conditions 
hereof and other good and valuable consideration, the delivery, receipt and sufficiency of 
which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: 
1 
1. CONDITION PRECEDENT. The sale of PP! is Ihe condition precedent {-Condition 
Precedent") to the modification of the 1988 contracl and all new duties and obligations 
imposed by this contract on the parties. The sale of PPI is defined as the close of escrow 
between Gilmer and the new buyer(s) that transfers ownership and control of PPI or the 
majority of its assets to the new buyer(s) regardless of the structure of I!ic sale 
between Gilmer and the new Buyer. In connection with this Condition Precedent PPI and 
Gilmer: 
A. Represent, warrant and agree that PPI presently has and at all times 
prior to completion by Gilmer of the services to be performed by him in 
paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 hereof, PPI will have in its employment a person other 
than Gilmer who is and will be as thoroughly familiar with the Process 
Technology and all aspects of application of the Coating to MegaDyne surgical 
instruments as is Gilmer. Such other person shall be able to and will perlorm 
the services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 hereof in the event Gilmer 
should die or become incapacitated prior to completion of such services himself; 
B. Agree if Gilmer shall die or become permanently incapacitated prior to 
occurrence of the Condition Precedent and completion of the paragraphs 3, 4, and 
5 services, then the Condition Precedent shall immediately terminate, if it has 
not already occurred, and PPI and/or Gilmer shall cause the paragraphs 3, 4, and 
5 services to forthwith be performed by such other person. Gilmer shall be 
deemed permanently incapacitated if by reason of accident, illness or otherwise 
i(f after a six month period from the date of the accident, illness or otherwise he 
is unable to reasonably and regularly perform those tasks and duties at PP! 
which he is and has been regularly performing prior to ihe accident, illness or 
otherwise happening, 
C. Agree that if the Condition Precedent has not otherwise occurrp.'1 • 
been terminated within 3 years from the date of execution befool id if 
Condition Precedent shall terminate at the end of such three year r i i i I 
2 MODIFICATION AND CONTINUANCE OF 1988 AGREEMENT. The designation and 
grant in the 1988 Agreement of and to PPI as the exclusive products coater and the only 
person or entity authorized to apply the Coating to MegaDyne Products is hereby 
modified on the happening of the Condition Precedent, and then PPI shall no longer the 
only person or entity authorized to apply the Coating to MegaDyne Products by means of 
the Process Technology. Thereafter, MegaDyne shall have first right to apply the Coating 
to MegaDyne Products by means of the Process Technology at and through use of its own 
facilities and employees or a Designee. PPI shall be relieved of all obligations imposed 
updn it under the 1988 Agreement for all MegaDyne Products for which PPI does not 
apply the Coating to and to which MegaDyne or a MegaDyne Designee applies the Coating 
as In this paragraph provided. All obligations imposed under the 1988 Agreement shall 
continue to be imposed upon and shall be performed by PPI for all MegaDyne Products 
for which PPI shall continue to or shall hereafter apply the Coating. 
2 
3. GILMER SERVICES. At the request and direction MegaDyne, Gilmer shall 
consult with and lurnish and provide to MegaDyne or its Designee all direction, 
knowledge, expertise, formulas, means and methods of application and procedures 
necessary, reasonable or desirable to enable MegaDyne to develop facilities and 
processes for and to apply the Coating by means of the Process Technology to MegaDyne 
Products with the same expertise, competence and results as heretofore accomplished by 
PPI and to facilitate and develop improvement to the Process Technology and Coating. 
Such duty of Gilmer shall include providing and disclosing knowledge, expertise and 
methods not provided by MegaDyne but learned, developed or enhanced by Gilmer and PPI 
through experience in use and application of the Process Technology in coating MegaDyne 
Products. 
4 LOCATION OF SERVICES. Gilmer shall perform the duties required of him in 
IIie previous paragraph either in Los Angeles or at a MegaDyne or MegaDynes Designee's 
facility in a prompt and expeditious manner, and shall devote such time and attention to 
the performance of such duties as shall be requested by MegaDyne and as shall be 
necessary to the prompt and expeditious acquisition of the ability by MegaDyne or its 
Designee to apply and conduct the Process Technology and the coating of MegaDyne 
Products. However, Gilmer shall not be required to provide services at a MegaDyne or 
MegaDyne's Designee's facility if travel is inadvisable due to reasons of his health or the 
health of his wife. In this event, all such services shall be provided to MegaDyne or 
MegaDyne's Designee's employees in Los Angeles. Further, under no circumstances, 
shall Gilmer be required to spend more than two consecutive weeks away from Los 
Angeles. 
5. STANDARD OF GILMER S E R V I C E S . Gilmer shall provide techf 
consultations and services to the best of his abilities to insure MegaDyne 
Designee is successful in applying the coating with the same expertise, competence and 
results as heretofore accomplished by PPI when PPI was under hjs direction and control. 
However, MegaDyne acknowledges and agrees that since the actual operation of the 
MegaDyne's or MedaDyne's Designee's coating facility will not be under Gilmer's 
direction or control and that Gilmer does not warrant their success nor shall he be held 
responsible for the ultimate success of MegaDyne's or MegaDyne's Designees application 
of coating to the same level of expertise, competence and results as heretofore 
accomplished by PPI when PPI was under his ownership and control. 
6. GILMER COMPENSATION, MegaDyne shall compensate and reimburse Gilmer as 
an individual for the duties described in paragraph 3, 4 and 5 above as follows: 
A. $75 per hour consulting fee for each hour spent by Gilmer in 
performing such duties and providing such services. 
B. Gilmer's billable hours shall include time spent In Los Angeles, 
In travel and at MegaDyne or MegaDyne Designee's facilities providing or 
preparing to provide the services required. 
C. When services are provided away from Los Angeles; the 
minimum daily charge shall be 8 hours per day. When the services require 
more than 5 consecutive working days Gilmer shall have the right to fly home on 
each Friday and fly back to the facility on the following Monday morning at 
MegaDyne expense. 
3 
D. Reasonable expenses for air travel, lodging, automobile rental, 
incidentals and meals when providing services away from Los Angeles and mileage 
and reimbursement for reasonable mileage and other expenses when providing 
services in Los Angeles. 
L. Gilmer shall subi nit an if tvoice for all consulting hours and 
expenses to MegaDyne on a monthly basis and shall receive payment of each 
invoice within 30 days from submission of the invoice to MegaDyne. 
•i the event the consulting services are performed by a person 
other than Gilmer, as provided in paragraph 1, the above consulting fees and 
reimbursement for costs and expenses shall be paid to PPL The below described 
"per unit coated fee* shall still be paid to Gilmer; his estate or his heirs as below 
provided. 
\s additional compensation for consulting Gilmer s)tall receive 
payment of a "per unit coated fee" of $.06 per unit for all MegaDyne Products 
coated with Teflon by MegaDyne or it's Designee(s) during the period set forth in 
subparagraph 61 below 
H. I he above compensation shall apply to all MegaDyne Products 
coated by MegaDyne or its Designee including any coated by PPL PPI shall reduce 
its charge for coating of any MegaDyne Products by am amount equal to the per 
unit coated fee as provided in subparagraph 6G above, that is paid to Gilmer, his 
estate or heirs on any MegaDyne products coated by PPI. Compensation under 
this section shall be payable 30 days from the end of each monih in which 
MegaDyne Products are coated by MegaDyne or its Designees. MegaDyne agrees to 
provide any and all such records as may be necessary to perform any audit 
necessary to insure their compliance with this section. In the event that such an 
audit discloses a variance of greater than 5% between what was paid and what was 
due Gilmer then the cost of such audit shall be borne by MegaDyne. 
I. I he compensation discussed in Paragraph 6G above on all coated 
MegaDyne Products shall begin upon the happening of the Condition Precedent or 
its termination as provided In subparagraph 1B, or 1C above. Further, this 
compensation shall continue until the end of the 10 year period in the event 
Gilmer Is unable to provide services due to reasons of health or if dies before the 
10 year period is up in which case the compensation shall be paid to his estate or 
heirs. 
7 SOLE COMPENSATION TO GILMER. The compensation provided in paragraph 6 
above shall be the sole compensation to which Gilmer shall be entitled for his services to 
be provided pursuant to this Agreement, and he shall not acquire or be entitled to any 
ownership or other interest in the process Technology or Coating or in MegaDyne or 
MegaDyne Products. 
4 
8. TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT. PPI agrees It lat it will cause to be duplicated 
and/or manufactured all jigs, tooling and other equipment specifically and exclusively 
designed for and used by PPI in coating MegaDyne Products and then shall transfer and 
deliver to MegaDyne the new jigs, tooling and other equipment it caused to be duplicated 
and/or manufacturer for the actual cost of such manufacturing and/or duplication. PPI 
will keep its original jigs, tooling and other equipment used in the coating of MegaDyne 
Products so if may continue to provide services to MegaDyne if MegaDyne so desires. 
9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. RELEASES AND COOPERATIONS. MegaDyne 
acknowledges that upon the happening of the Condition Precedent or its termination as 
specified above PPI shall not have and hereby releases PP! from obligations under the 
1988 Agreement to coat, in the manner and under the time tables provided in the 1988 
Agreement, those MegaDyne products that are hereafter coated by MegaDyne or its 
Designees. PPI acknowledges and agrees that it will no longer be the only person 
authorized to apply Coating to MegaDyne Products by means of the Process Technology 
and that release by MegaDyne of PPI from obligation to coat MegaDyne Products that will 
or in the future may be coated by MegaDyne or its Designees is adequate and sufficient 
consideration of PPI no longer being the exclusive coater of MegaDyne Products. PPI 
further acknowledges and agrees that if it desires or seeks additional consideration for 
termination of its status as exclusive coater of MegaDyne Products, MegaDyne is not 
obligated to provide such consideration and PPI will not seek such consideration from 
MegaDyne. To the extent reasonably necessary, PPI shall cooperate with and assist 
Gilmer in the performance of his duties under Paragraph 3 above. 
10 RIGHT AND AUTHORIZATION TQ PROVIDE SERVICES, Gilmer and PPI hereby 
acknowledge, represent and warrant that Gilmer, or such PP) employee as called for in 
paragraph 1, has the unrestricted right to perform and provide, and PPI and Gilmer 
authorize them to provide and perform, the duties and services to be provided by in 
paragraph 3, 4, and 5 above. 
NQN-CONFLICT WITH OTHER AGREEMENT S, The execution, delivery of and 
performance of this Agreement will not conflict with, result in a breach of or constitute 
a default under or violate any terms or conditions of any agreements, contracts, laws, 
rules, regulations, judgment or orders to which Gilmer, PPI and/or MegaDyne Is 
subject and will not conflict with or violate any Articles of Incorporation, By-laws CM 
other corporate documents of obligations of PPI or MegaDyne. 
12. INVALIDITY. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provisions of this 
Agreement shall not effect any other provisions thereof, and this Agreement shall be 
construed in all respects as if any invalid or unenforceable provisions were omitted 
13. BINDING EFFECT AND AMENDMENT, The provisions of this Agreement shall 
be binding upon and inure to the benefit of each of the parties and their respective 
successors and assigns, and no amendment or modification of this Agreement shall be 
valid unless it is In writing and signed by the party or parties sought to be charged 
thereby. 
5 
14. EFFECT ON 1988 AGREEMENT. Except as modified hereir.. 
Agreement and all terms and conditions thereof shall remain In full force and effect and 
shall be binding upon the parties as therein provided, and this Agreement and the 1988 
Agreement represent all understandings and agreements between the parties on the 
subject matter thereof. 
15. PARAGRAPH HEADINGS. Paragraph headings in this Agreement are for 
convenience only and shall not be used to interpret or construe it provisions 
16. G O V E R N I N G LAW. This Agreement shall be const rued under and shal l be 
go •emed by and in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
17 ATTORNEY 'S FEES. In the event of breach or default of any of the terms or 
condi t ions o this Agreement , the defau l t ing party shall pay al l cos ts and expenses , 
including reasonab le at lorney's fees, ar is ing out of breach or defau l t thereof, whether 
incurred wi th or without suit and both before and after judgment . 
IN W I T N E S S WHEREOF III J , ,' ,H i «,„h ,1 I U J I uxuculod the date and year first 
above written 
ME(3fcQYNE MEDICAL PRQDOSfS, INC. PREMIUM^ASTIC 5 INI &? 
By yLj>^<y&. gZ. i>„,,: y , 
/ I / / 
i j. / / 
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PREMIUM PLASTICS, INC. 
13542 VERMONT AVE. 
Q13) 634-3294 
PARAMOUNT. CALIFORNIA 90723 
Q13) 774^0070 
HARVEY V.E. GILMER. Ji. 
CONTRACT MODIFICATION 
This is a mod i f icat ion to the contract entered into between 
MegaDyne Medical Products, Inc. (Mega Dyne), PREMIUM PLASTICS, 
INC. (PPI) and Harvey V.E. Gilmer, Jr.(Gilmer) dated March 
26, 199 1 . 
MegaDyne will have present & future suppliers of metal Cautery 
Tips & Laproscopi c devices provide a copy of all invoices 
to: Harvey V.E. Gilmer, Jr. 
30521 Miraleste Dr. 
Rancho Palos Verdes, Ca., 90274 
Gilmer will treat 
in formation. 
all invoices & in format ion as confidential 
MegaDyne Medical Products, Inc 
Harvey V.E. Gilmerj Jr. 
PREMIUM PLASTICS, INC 
Tab 8 
CONTRACT MODIFICATION 
This Contract Modification made this V ^ day of September, 1997, between MegaDyne 
Medical Products(MegaDyne), Premium Plastics, Inc. (Premium) and Harvey Van Epps Gilmer 
Jr., (Gilmer) WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS under that certain agreement between MegaDyne, formerly American Medical 
Products, Inc., and Premium Plastics, Inc. dated June 1,1988, Premium Plastics, Inc was 
appointed the exclusive coater of electro-surgical electrodes marketed by MegaDyne, and 
WHEREAS, ON March 26,1991, said agreement was modified to allow for the possible sale of 
assets of PREMIUM PLASTICS, INC., of which Gilmer was President and sole or majority 
shareholder, and to insure the continued availability of Gilmer to provide technical support and 
consultation services to MegaDyne after the sale and to permit MegaDyne and others 
designated by MegaDyne to coat MegaDyne products at MegaDyne's facilities, or elsewhere, 
and 
WHEREAS, In consideration of the surrender of such exclusive coating rights, MegaDyne 
agreed to pay Premium six cents ($.06) for each electrode coated by MegaDyne, and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to further modify said agreement of March 26,1991, to 
provide that payment of said sum shall be based upon electrodes sold rather than upon 
electrodes coated, 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed: 
1. MegaDyne shall continue to pay Premium six cents ($.06) for each electrode coated by 
MegaDyne through September 30,1997. 
2. MegaDyne shall take a physical inventory to determine the actual number of electrodes 
coated as of September 30,1997 to insure that Premium is paid for all electrodes coated as of 
said date and will record the date of all lot numbers of electrodes remaining unbilled as of that 
date, and all electrodes coated after said date. 
3. Beginning October 1,1997 and continuing until December 1, 2005 MegaDyne shall pay 
to Premium each month six cents ($.06) for each coated electrode invoiced or shipped to a third 
party for use or resale, including samples and consignments with lot numbers dated on or after 
September 1,1997. Returns and Bad Debts will not be debited against payments due Premium. 
4. MegaDyne shall accompany said monthly payments with a computer printout reporting 
all electrodes invoiced and/or shipped during the month with consecutive invoice numbers, 
date, total electrodes on the invoice and applicable lot numbers. Payment for said month will 
be made within a month and ten days after end of said month. 
5. In October, 1997 M^aDyne will receive credit for the remcrihing September 30, 1997 
inventory of coated electrodes not billed out in September. These are electrodes that 
MegaDyne previously paid Premium for under the old program. When calculating the payment 
for October, MegaDyne shall determine the total number of electrodes sold or transferred 
during October, 1997 and then subtract the remaining, unbilled September 30. 1997 inventory 
of coated electrodes and pay Premium on the difference if any monies are due. 
6. Except as expressly modified by herein, all terms and conditions of the agreement of 
March 26, 1991. shall remain in full force and effect. 
MEGADYNE MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC HARVEY VAN EPPS GILMER. JR. 
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